1. bookVolume 2 (2006): Issue 21 (November 2006)
Journal Details
License
Format
Journal
eISSN
2182-2875
First Published
16 Apr 2017
Publication timeframe
4 times per year
Languages
English
access type Open Access

On an argument of Segal’s against singular object-dependent thoughts

Published Online: 31 Dec 2018
Page range: 19 - 37
Journal Details
License
Format
Journal
eISSN
2182-2875
First Published
16 Apr 2017
Publication timeframe
4 times per year
Languages
English
Abstract

This paper discusses and criticizes Segal’s 1989 argument against singular object-dependent thoughts. His argument aims at showing that object-dependent thoughts are explanatorily redundant. My criticism of Segal’s argument has two parts. First, I appeal to common anti-individualist arguments to the effect that Segal’s type of argument only succeeds in establishing that object-dependent thoughts are explanatorily redundant for those aspects of subjects’ behaviour that do not require reference to external objects. Secondly, Segal’s view on singular thoughts is at odds with his view on the semantics of proper names, which favours the singularity and object-dependency of the truth-conditions of sentences in which they occur. In particular, his views are at odds with a position he holds, that truth-conditional semantics can adequately account for all aspects of speakers’ linguistic competence in the use of proper names.

Blackburn, Simon. 1984. Spreading the Word. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Search in Google Scholar

Burge, Tyler. 1986. Individualism and Psychology, The Philosophical Review 95: 3–45.10.2307/2185131Search in Google Scholar

Burge, Tyler. 1977. Belief De Re. Journal of Philosophy 74: 339–62.10.2307/2025871Search in Google Scholar

Carruthers, Peter. 1987. Russellian Thoughts. Mind 96: 18–35.10.1093/mind/XCVI.381.18Open DOISearch in Google Scholar

Evans, Gareth. 1973. The Causal Theory of Names. Aristotelian Society Suppl. Vol. 47: 187–208. Reprinted in Collected Papers. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1–24.Search in Google Scholar

Evans, Gareth. 1982. The Varieties of Reference. J. McDowell (ed.), Oxford: Clarendon Press.Search in Google Scholar

Frege, Gottlob. 1892. On Sense and Meaning. In P. Geach and M. Black (eds.) Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege. 1980 (3rd Edition), Oxford UK and Cambridge USA: Basil Blackwell, 56–78.Search in Google Scholar

Grice, Paul. 1969. Vacuous Names. In D. Davidson and J. Hintikka (eds), Words and Objections. Dordrecht: Reidel, 118–45.Search in Google Scholar

Kripke, Saul. 1980. Naming and Necessity. Oxford UK and Cambridge USA: Basil Blackwell.Search in Google Scholar

Larson, Richard and Gabriel Segal. 1995. Knowledge and Meaning, an Introduction to Semantic Theory. Cambridge Mass.: MIT Press.10.7551/mitpress/4076.001.0001Search in Google Scholar

McDowell, John. 1977. On the Sense and Reference of a Proper Name. Mind 86: 159–85.10.1093/mind/LXXXVI.342.159Open DOISearch in Google Scholar

McDowell, John 1982. Truth-Value Gaps. In L. J. Cohen, J. Łoś, H. Pfeiffer, I. P. Podewski (eds.) Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science VI. Amsterdam, New York and Oxford: North-Holland Publishing Company, 299–313.10.1016/S0049-237X(09)70201-0Search in Google Scholar

McDowell, John 1984. De Re Senses. in C. Wright (ed.), Frege: Tradition and Influence. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 98–109.Search in Google Scholar

McDowell, John 1986. Singular Thought and the Extent of Inner Space. In P. Pettit and J. McDowell (eds), Subject, Thought and Context. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 136–68.Search in Google Scholar

Neale, Stephen. 1990. Descriptions. Cambridge Mass.: MIT Press.Search in Google Scholar

Peacocke, Christopher. 1975. Proper Names, Reference and Rigid Designation. In S. Blackburn (ed), Meaning, Reference and Necessity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 109–32.Search in Google Scholar

Pettit, Philip. 1986. ‘Broad-minded Explanation and Psychology’, in Subject, Thought and Context, P. Pettit and J. McDowell (eds), Oxford: Clarendon Press, 17–58.Search in Google Scholar

Recanati, François. 1993. Direct Reference. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.Search in Google Scholar

Sainsbury, Mark. 2005. Reference Without Referents, Oxford: Clarendon Press.10.1093/0199241805.001.0001Search in Google Scholar

Segal, Gabriel. 1989. The Return of the Individual. Mind 98: 39–57.10.1093/mind/XCVIII.389.39Open DOISearch in Google Scholar

Williamson, Timothy. 2000. Knowledge and its Limits, Oxford: OUP.Search in Google Scholar

Recommended articles from Trend MD

Plan your remote conference with Sciendo