1. bookVolume 18 (2017): Issue 1 (April 2017)
Journal Details
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Format
Journal
eISSN
1647-659X
First Published
01 Mar 2016
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3 times per year
Languages
English
access type Open Access

Enactivism, Radical Enactivism and Predictive Processing: What is Radical in Cognitive Science?

Published Online: 06 Jun 2017
Volume & Issue: Volume 18 (2017) - Issue 1 (April 2017)
Page range: 54 - 83
Journal Details
License
Format
Journal
eISSN
1647-659X
First Published
01 Mar 2016
Publication timeframe
3 times per year
Languages
English
Abstract

According to Enactivism, cognition should be understood in terms of a dynamic interaction between an acting organism and its environment. Further, this view holds that organisms do not passively receive information from this environment, they rather selectively create this environment by engaging in interaction with the world. Radical Enactivism adds that basic cognition does so without entertaining representations and hence that representations are not an essential constituent of cognition. Some proponents think that getting rid of representations amounts to a revolutionary alternative to standard views about cognition. To emphasize the impact, they claim that this ‘radicalization’ should be applied to all enactivist friendly views, including, another current and potentially revolutionary approach to cognition: predictive processing. In this paper, we will show that this is not the case. After introducing the problem (section 2), we will argue (section 3) that ‘radicalizing’ predictive processing does not add any value to this approach. After this (section 4), we will analyze whether or not radical Enactivism can count as a revolution within cognitive science at all and conclude that it cannot. Finally, in section 5 we will claim that cognitive science is better off when embracing heterogeneity.

Keywords

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