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Informacje o czasopiśmie
Format
Czasopismo
eISSN
1647-659X
Pierwsze wydanie
01 Mar 2016
Częstotliwość wydawania
3 razy w roku
Języki
Angielski

Wyszukiwanie

Tom 15 (2016): Zeszyt 1 (April 2016)

Informacje o czasopiśmie
Format
Czasopismo
eISSN
1647-659X
Pierwsze wydanie
01 Mar 2016
Częstotliwość wydawania
3 razy w roku
Języki
Angielski

Wyszukiwanie

5 Artykułów
Otwarty dostęp

Pluralism, Pragmatism and Functional Explanations

Data publikacji: 30 Apr 2016
Zakres stron: 1 - 18

Abstrakt

Abstract

While many philosophers speak of ‘pluralism’ within philosophy of biology, there has been little said about what such pluralism amounts to or what its underlying assumptions are. This has provoked so me anxiety about whether pluralism is compatible with their commitment to naturalism (Cussins 1992). This paper surveys three prominent pluralist positions (Sandra Mitchell and Michael Dietrich’s (2006) ‘integrative pluralism’, and both Peter Godfrey-Smith’s (1993) and Beth Preston’s (1998) pluralist analyses of functional explanations in evolutionary biology) and demonstrates how all three are committed to a form of pragmatism. This analysis both clarifies the justification and grounding of pluralism and allows these pluralisms to avoid the criticisms of Cussins. I close by making some more general points about pluralism and its relationship to history and integration.

Słowa kluczowe

  • pluralism
  • philosophy of biology
  • pragmatism
  • naturalism
  • functional explanations
Otwarty dostęp

How and why actions are selected: action selection and the dark room problem

Data publikacji: 30 Apr 2016
Zakres stron: 19 - 45

Abstrakt

Abstract

In this paper, I examine an evolutionary approach to the action selection problem and illustrate how it helps raise an objection to the predictive processing account. Clark examines the predictive processing account as a theory of brain function that aims to unify perception, action, and cognition, but - despite this aim - fails to consider action selection overtly. He off ers an account of action control with the implication that minimizing prediction error is an imperative of living organisms because, according to the predictive processing account, action is employed to fulfill expectations and reduce prediction error. One way in which this can be achieved is by seeking out the least stimulating environment and staying there (Friston et al. 2012: 2). Bayesian, neuroscientific, and machine learning approaches into a single framework whose overarching principle is the minimization of surprise (or, equivalently, the maximization of expectation. But, most living organisms do not find, and stay in, surprise free environments. This paper explores this objection, also called the “dark room problem”, and examines Clark’s response to the problem. Finally, I recommend that if supplemented with an account of action selection, Clark’s account will avoid the dark room problem.

Otwarty dostęp

Ortega y Gasset on Georg Cantor’s Theory of Transfinite Numbers

Data publikacji: 30 Apr 2016
Zakres stron: 46 - 70

Abstrakt

Abstract

Ortega y Gasset is known for his philosophy of life and his effort to propose an alternative to both realism and idealism. The goal of this article is to focus on an unfamiliar aspect of his thought. The focus will be given to Ortega’s interpretation of the advancements in modern mathematics in general and Cantor’s theory of transfinite numbers in particular. The main argument is that Ortega acknowledged the historical importance of the Cantor’s Set Theory, analyzed it and articulated a response to it. In his writings he referred many times to the advancements in modern mathematics and argued that mathematics should be based on the intuition of counting. In response to Cantor’s mathematics Ortega presented what he defined as an ‘absolute positivism’. In this theory he did not mean to naturalize cognition or to follow the guidelines of the Comte’s positivism, on the contrary. His aim was to present an alternative to Cantor’s mathematics by claiming that mathematicians are allowed to deal only with objects that are immediately present and observable to intuition. Ortega argued that the infinite set cannot be present to the intuition and therefore there is no use to differentiate between cardinals of different infinite sets.

Słowa kluczowe

  • Ortega y Gasset
  • Georg Cantor
  • Galileo
  • infinite set
  • intuitionism
Otwarty dostęp

Uma avaliação do argumento ontológico modal de Plantinga

Data publikacji: 30 Apr 2016
Zakres stron: 71 - 84

Abstrakt

Abstract

My aim in this paper is to critically assess Plantinga’s modal ontological argument for existence of God, such as it is presented in the book “The Nature of Necessity” (1974). Plantinga tries to show that this argument is (i) valid and (ii) it is rational to believe in his main premise, namely “there is a possible world in which maximal greatness is instantiated”. On the one hand, I want to show that this argument is logically valid in both systems B and S5 of modal logic. On the other hand, I think that this argument is not a good argument to show that God exists or that it is rational to believe in God.

Słowa kluczowe

  • Modal Ontological Argument
  • Modal Logic
  • the Rationality of Theistic Belief
  • Alvin Plantinga
Otwarty dostęp

Interview with Shahid Rahman

Data publikacji: 30 Apr 2016
Zakres stron: 85 - 96

Abstrakt

5 Artykułów
Otwarty dostęp

Pluralism, Pragmatism and Functional Explanations

Data publikacji: 30 Apr 2016
Zakres stron: 1 - 18

Abstrakt

Abstract

While many philosophers speak of ‘pluralism’ within philosophy of biology, there has been little said about what such pluralism amounts to or what its underlying assumptions are. This has provoked so me anxiety about whether pluralism is compatible with their commitment to naturalism (Cussins 1992). This paper surveys three prominent pluralist positions (Sandra Mitchell and Michael Dietrich’s (2006) ‘integrative pluralism’, and both Peter Godfrey-Smith’s (1993) and Beth Preston’s (1998) pluralist analyses of functional explanations in evolutionary biology) and demonstrates how all three are committed to a form of pragmatism. This analysis both clarifies the justification and grounding of pluralism and allows these pluralisms to avoid the criticisms of Cussins. I close by making some more general points about pluralism and its relationship to history and integration.

Słowa kluczowe

  • pluralism
  • philosophy of biology
  • pragmatism
  • naturalism
  • functional explanations
Otwarty dostęp

How and why actions are selected: action selection and the dark room problem

Data publikacji: 30 Apr 2016
Zakres stron: 19 - 45

Abstrakt

Abstract

In this paper, I examine an evolutionary approach to the action selection problem and illustrate how it helps raise an objection to the predictive processing account. Clark examines the predictive processing account as a theory of brain function that aims to unify perception, action, and cognition, but - despite this aim - fails to consider action selection overtly. He off ers an account of action control with the implication that minimizing prediction error is an imperative of living organisms because, according to the predictive processing account, action is employed to fulfill expectations and reduce prediction error. One way in which this can be achieved is by seeking out the least stimulating environment and staying there (Friston et al. 2012: 2). Bayesian, neuroscientific, and machine learning approaches into a single framework whose overarching principle is the minimization of surprise (or, equivalently, the maximization of expectation. But, most living organisms do not find, and stay in, surprise free environments. This paper explores this objection, also called the “dark room problem”, and examines Clark’s response to the problem. Finally, I recommend that if supplemented with an account of action selection, Clark’s account will avoid the dark room problem.

Otwarty dostęp

Ortega y Gasset on Georg Cantor’s Theory of Transfinite Numbers

Data publikacji: 30 Apr 2016
Zakres stron: 46 - 70

Abstrakt

Abstract

Ortega y Gasset is known for his philosophy of life and his effort to propose an alternative to both realism and idealism. The goal of this article is to focus on an unfamiliar aspect of his thought. The focus will be given to Ortega’s interpretation of the advancements in modern mathematics in general and Cantor’s theory of transfinite numbers in particular. The main argument is that Ortega acknowledged the historical importance of the Cantor’s Set Theory, analyzed it and articulated a response to it. In his writings he referred many times to the advancements in modern mathematics and argued that mathematics should be based on the intuition of counting. In response to Cantor’s mathematics Ortega presented what he defined as an ‘absolute positivism’. In this theory he did not mean to naturalize cognition or to follow the guidelines of the Comte’s positivism, on the contrary. His aim was to present an alternative to Cantor’s mathematics by claiming that mathematicians are allowed to deal only with objects that are immediately present and observable to intuition. Ortega argued that the infinite set cannot be present to the intuition and therefore there is no use to differentiate between cardinals of different infinite sets.

Słowa kluczowe

  • Ortega y Gasset
  • Georg Cantor
  • Galileo
  • infinite set
  • intuitionism
Otwarty dostęp

Uma avaliação do argumento ontológico modal de Plantinga

Data publikacji: 30 Apr 2016
Zakres stron: 71 - 84

Abstrakt

Abstract

My aim in this paper is to critically assess Plantinga’s modal ontological argument for existence of God, such as it is presented in the book “The Nature of Necessity” (1974). Plantinga tries to show that this argument is (i) valid and (ii) it is rational to believe in his main premise, namely “there is a possible world in which maximal greatness is instantiated”. On the one hand, I want to show that this argument is logically valid in both systems B and S5 of modal logic. On the other hand, I think that this argument is not a good argument to show that God exists or that it is rational to believe in God.

Słowa kluczowe

  • Modal Ontological Argument
  • Modal Logic
  • the Rationality of Theistic Belief
  • Alvin Plantinga
Otwarty dostęp

Interview with Shahid Rahman

Data publikacji: 30 Apr 2016
Zakres stron: 85 - 96

Abstrakt

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