Volume 12 (2023): Issue 1-2 (March 2023)
Indian Logic

This special issue on Indian logic consists of nine research papers dealing with different aspects of Indian logic by nine distinguished authors. It is divided into three sections, such as Nyāya logic, Buddhist logic and Jaina logic. The papers deal with the issue of inference and allied concepts from both historical and conceptual considerations. Indian logic followed linguistic model and thereby in India it gives the foundation of epistemology and the development of philosophy of language.

According to the Navya Naiyāyikas, inference is the knowledge, which is produced out of consideration. But what is to be understood by the term ‘consideration’ or ‘parāmarśa’? According to them, parāmarśa or consideration is the factor through the operation of which the inferential conclusion can be attained. Parāmarśa has been defined as the knowledge of the existence of the hetu or reason in the pakṣa or subject, which reason is characterized by its being concomitant with the sādhya, the knowledge in the form of parāmarśa is actually caused by the knowledge of invariable concomitance of probans (hetu) with the probandum (sādhya) and the knowledge of the existence of the hetu in the subject (pakṣa). It has been said by Viśvanātha that the cognition of the existence of probans or hetu in the subject of inference along with the cognition of the prabans or hetu as pervaded by sādhya is called parāmarśa (pakṣasya vyāpyavṛttitvadhīḥ parāmarśa ucyate). The invariable co-existence in the form ‘where there is smoke, there is fire’ is known as vyāpti or invariable concomitance. Here the invariable coexistence (avyabhicārī sāhacarya) between the probans and probandum (i.e., smoke and fire) is the definition of vyāpti. The term ‘co-existence’ means remaining in the same locus of the probans with the probandum, which is not the counter positive of the absolute negation existing in the locus of the hetu. To Gangeśa, the knowledge of the co-existence of the probans and probandum along with the absence of the knowledge of deviation of the probans is the cause of ascertaining vyāpti. Repeated observations, of course, sometimes act as a promoter (prayojaka) in ascertaining vyāpti by removing the doubt of deviation. The doubt of deviation can be removed sometimes by Tarka or sometimes by the absence of the collocation of causes of doubt, which is called svataḥsiddhaḥ. Gangeśa admits sāmānyalakṣaṇā as a pratyāsatti in ascertaining vyāpti between smoke-in-general and fire-in-general. To him, the super-normal connection through universal (sāmānyalakṣaṇā pratyāsatti) has got a prominent role in ascertaining vyāpti. If somebody challenges about the validity of the syllogistic argument in the form “The mountain is fiery as it possesses smoke” (parvato vahnimān dhūmāt), the philosophers of Nyāya and Navya-nyāya persuasion will justify the same with the help of five constituents (avayava-s). The process is called parāthānumāna (syllogistic argument for making others understand). The constituents of a syllogism are proposition (pratijňā), reason (hetu), example (udāharaṇa), application (upanaya), and conclusion (nigamana).

There are two major ways in which Buddhist logic is developed. The first one is represented by Nāgārjuna-Candrakῑrti tradition through the use of dialectics and the second way of development is found in the works of Diṅnāga and Dharmakῑrti through the use of hetu (probans). This second way of logic has further been developed by the works of Jinendrabuddhi and Ratnakῑrti. The paper is an attempt to show the historical development of epistemic logic as developed by the Buddhist philosophers and their relevance for our time.

As the title of the present article shows, it highlights the three philosophically integrated areas – (1) pramāṇa-epistemology (theory of comprehensive knowledge involving both perception and inference), (2) logic (although a part of pramāṇa-epistemology, it has two modes, namely, inductive reasoning and deductive reasoning), and (3) language (or semantics, i.e. the double negation theory of meaning, which falls under inference). These are interconnected as well as overlapping within the Buddhist mainstream tradition of the process philosophy as opposed to the substantialist philosophy. The same is the case with the three celebrated Buddhist thinkers – Vasubandhu, Dignāga (also spelt as Diññāṇa), and Dharmakīrti – who develop their radical and critical views focusing on these areas in historical-cum-philosophical order. It is worth noting that within the same mainstream Buddhist tradition, each one of the three thinkers picks up the problematic issues from their predecessors – from the Buddha to their immediate predecessors respectively – for their solutions against the backdrop of the two conflicting mainstream traditions – Buddhist and non-Buddhist. The central focus of these thinkers is first to identify the crucial issues, doctrinal principles, terminology, and methodology in their own ways and conceptual frameworks, which generate not only the mutual conflicts in the course of dialogues but also strengthen their positions by means of their new radical ideas, innovations, terminologies, methodologies, and doctrinal principles. As a result, the three selected areas and their crucial issues are explained, elaborated, and interpretated for better understanding. All of which are rooted in the Buddha’s path of wisdom, ethics, and liberation from the human predicament (duḥkha-nivṛtti). In this grand project of the deepest concerns, the Buddha utilized multiple strategies like understanding and controlling the problematic nature of the mind (Pāli citta, manasa) and its concomitance (Pāli cetasika, dhammā) by means of the concentrative meditation (Pāli jhāna, Sanskrit (hereafter Skt., dhyāna), cultivation of knowledge (Pāli vijjā, Skt. vidyā) and conduct/moral purity (Pāli caraṇa, Skt. ācaraṇa), destruction of afflictions/defilements (Pāli kilesa, Skt. kleśa), critical and logical thinking with valid arguments, and so on. His disciples also treat him as the possessor of valid method, arguments, meaning, practice, and purpose (Skt. pramāṇabhūta, the term used by Dignāga). He believed in the common humanity as the community of sufferers and the autonomy of every human being (Pāli attakāra), but strongly rejected the hierarchy of humanity on the basis of caste, birth, and dogmatic religious identity. For these reasons, following the Buddha and his celebrated followers like Vasubandhu, Dignāga, and Dharmakīrti, my task in this article is how to clearly and elaborately discuss the above identified issues and theories, first to understand them for myself and then logically prove the whole process of knowledge and the designed purpose through communication to those who have the intention to hear and understand the framework of common language for their benefits. I wish the readers like students and young teachers benefit from my research work. Further, since my learning of the Tibetan language is zero, but comfortable in Sanskrit and Pāli, I have been heavily dependent on three great modern thinkers who have widely written independently and also translated the Buddhist Tibetan texts, which were translated from the original Sanskrit texts now lost, into English in the areas of Buddhist epistemology, logic, and semantics. These modern scholars are Masaaki Hattori, Shoryo Katsura, and Richard Hayes. Besides them, I have also little benefitted from some other scholars who have worked in the same areas.

The paper discusses anumāna and its variety in general from the point of view of inferential cognition for the sake of oneself as well as for the sake of others; i.e. svārthānumāna and parārthānumāna as given in the Buddhist tradition of logic, especially with parārthānumāna, its nature and role. The paper argues that the Buddhist intent of division of anumāna into svārthānumāna and parārthānumāna was to bring Buddha-vacanas under the category of parārthānumāna and to save them from being classified under śabda pramāṇa. It contends that such a division was not just an epistemological demand, but had a deeper philosophical significance in the Buddhist conceptual framework. Such a division is, therefore, intended to reject the role of śabda as an extra causal means or pramāṇa. The paper identifies the logical commitment in Buddhist tradition as hetu-centric commitment as it differs from the Nyāya tradition of vyāpti-centric one.

In the paper, the author addresses the question of Dharmakīrti’s philosophical identity afresh. While acknowledging both the elements, external realism of Sautrāintika and idealism of Yogācāra, the author does disagree with the claim which is sometimes made, that Dharmakīrti’s idealism as his ultimate position and accepts realism only at conventional level. The author shows how Dharmakīrti in Pramāṇavārttika oscillates between the two positions and that he must have been attracted to both the positions for different reasons. He was attracted to idealism from critical point of view, when he was critical about the limitations of Sautrāntika realism (which itself can be called critical realism). He was attracted to realism for its capacity to explain the diverse phenomena and lead human beings to their goals. The author denies the claim made by some scholars that Dharmakīrti’s idealism can be called just an epistemic one. He argues that it did have a metaphysical dimension which is hard to defend. The author shows that Dharmakīrti’s idealist stance has adverse implications to the realist epistemology and logic which constitute his mainstream position; the implications, which Dharmakīrti does not take up for discussion.

In Jaina philosophy, pramāṇa is accepted as a definitive knowledge of an object and knowledge itself. There are many treatises on Jaina pramāṇa-śāstra which include epistemology and logic according to Jainism. Since Siddhasena’s Nyāyāvatra more than forty texts and commentaries are available on this subject. Five types of knowledge i.e. matijñāna (knowledge through sense organs and mind), śrutajñāna (scriptural of verbal knowledge), avadhijñāna (clairvoyance), manaḥparyayajñāna (knowing the modes of others’ minds) and kevaljñāna (knowledge of all substances and modes) as mentioned in the canonical literature are the basis of the development of Jaina pramāṇa-śāstra. Contributions of Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka (720–780), Vidyānanda (775–840), Ananatavirya (950–990), Vādiraj (1025), Abhayadevasuri (10^th century), Prabhācandra (980–1065), Vādi devasśūri (1086–1169, Hemacandra (1088–1173), Dharmabushaṇa (15^th century), Yaśovijaya (18^th century) are very important in the development of Jaina pramāṇa-śāstra, the Tattvārthasūtra and its commentarial literature has also a significant role in developing the Jaina pramāṇa-śāstra. This development has three aspects-conceptual, analytical and logical. The Tattvārthasūtra is the first text which established the classification of knowledge as two types of pramāṇa – pratyakṣa (perception) and parokṣa (indirect pramāṇa). An intensive discussion on Jaina epistemology or pramāṇa-śāstra is seen in the commentarial literature of the Tattvārthasūtra.

The Jaina tradition is known for its distinctive approach to prima facie incompatible claims about the nature of reality. The Jaina approach to conflicting views is to seek an integration or synthesis, in which apparently contrary views are resolved into a vantage point from which each view can be seen as expressing part of a larger, more complex truth. Viewed by some contemporary Jaina thinkers as an extension of the principle of ahiṃsā into the realm of intellectual discourse, Jaina logic marks quite a distinctive stance toward the concept of logical consistency. While it does not directly violate the law of excluded middle, it does, one might say, navigate this principle in a highly and potentially useful way. The potential usefulness of Jaina logic includes the possibility of its use in arguing for the position known as religious pluralism or worldview pluralism. This is a view which many philosophers see as holding great promise in developing a way to think about differences across worldviews in ways that do not lead to the kind of conflict and polarization that all too often characterizes ideological differences in today’s world.

This paper presents an integralist approach to Jaina logic. This is built around an analysis of the pivotal notion of antarvyāpti in Jaina logic. It is shown in this connection why antarvyāpti needs to be considered the ‘Core Perspective/Problem’ of Jaina logic. Next, it is shown how all the salient features of Jaina logic (as viewed from its language-oriented perspective and the epistemic perspective respectively) stand intimately related to the so-called core perspective. In the remaining sections of the paper topics like relationship of the core perspective i) to various non-standard systems of logic [DL, FL, NMR etc.,], ii) to the four pillars and to the eight MPC’s of Jaina philosophy, iii) to some bluntly unimaginative ways of looking at Jaina logic [e.g., Ducko-Rabbitism], iv) to the scheme of classification of propositions in Jaina logic, v) to the resulting conceptual economies related to methodology, and especially to a unified theory of Hetvābhāsa and, finally, vi) to a re-assessment of Frege-Husserl discord in the light of the significance of Jñānātmakatā vs Vākyātmakatā in Jaina logic, etc., have been discussed.

The interview given by Dilipkumar Mohanta (b.1959), a Professor of Philosophy in the University of Calcutta (India). He is presently the Joint Secretary of Indian Philosophical Congress (Estd. 1925). He is a former Vice-Chancellor of the University of Kalyani, and also the founder Vice-Chancellor of the Sanskrit College and University. He is a former member of Indian Council of Philosophical Research. Professor Mohanta is the recipient of number of awards for his academic contribution; such as US Government State Scholar Award (2008) at the University of California (Santa Barbara), Fulbright-Nehru Visiting Lecturer (2011) at the University of Florida, William Paton Fellowship at the University of Birmingham (2015), IUC Associate at IIAS (Shimla, 2001-2003), Professor B. M. Barua Samman (award) in 2016, Jan Jacobsen prize (2016), Manjusree Samman (2022), Kamaladevi Smriti Samman (2022). He is the author of 15 books and 60 papers (in English & Bengali) published in journals in India and abroad. Cognitive Scepticism and Indian Philosophy, Studies in Vaidalyasutra of Nagarjuna, Studies in Jayarasibhatta’s Critique of Knowing from Words, Advaita-Siddhanta-Sara-samgraha (Sanskrit text with Introduction in English), Collected Works of Brajendra Nath Seal (ed.) are some of his important books in English. Mohanta also authored some books on Buddhist Philosophy, Advaita Vedanta Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion and Political Philosophy in Bengali.