Journal & Issues

Volume 14 (2022): Issue 67 (December 2022)

Volume 14 (2022): Issue 66 (December 2022)
Special Issue: Varieties of Context-Sensitivity in a Pluri-Propositionalist Reflexive Semantic Framework

Volume 14 (2022): Issue 65 (November 2022)

Volume 14 (2022): Issue 64 (May 2022)

Volume 13 (2021): Issue 63 (December 2021)
Special Issue on Nothing to Come by Correia & Rosenkranz

Volume 13 (2021): Issue 62 (December 2021)
Ethics and Aesthetics: Issues at Their Intersection

Volume 13 (2021): Issue 61 (November 2021)

Volume 13 (2021): Issue 60 (May 2021)

Volume 12 (2020): Issue 59 (December 2020)

Volume 12 (2020): Issue 58 (December 2020)
SPECIAL ISSUE: ON THE VERY IDEA OF LOGICAL FORM

Volume 12 (2020): Issue 57 (November 2020)

Volume 12 (2020): Issue 56 (May 2020)

Volume 11 (2019): Issue 55 (December 2019)
Special Issue: Chalmers on Virtual Reality

Volume 11 (2019): Issue 54 (December 2019)
Special Issue: III Blasco Disputatio, Singular terms in fiction. Fictional and “real” names

Volume 11 (2019): Issue 53 (November 2019)

Volume 11 (2019): Issue 52 (May 2019)

Volume 10 (2018): Issue 51 (December 2018)
SYMPOSIUM ON JASON STANLEY’S “HOW PROPAGANDA WORKS”

Volume 10 (2018): Issue 50 (December 2018)

Volume 10 (2018): Issue 49 (November 2018)

Volume 10 (2018): Issue 48 (May 2018)

Volume 9 (2017): Issue 47 (December 2017)

Volume 9 (2017): Issue 46 (November 2017)

Volume 9 (2017): Issue 45 (October 2017)

Volume 9 (2017): Issue 44 (May 2017)

Volume 8 (2016): Issue 43 (November 2016)

Volume 8 (2016): Issue 42 (May 2016)

Volume 7 (2015): Issue 41 (November 2015)

Volume 7 (2015): Issue 40 (May 2015)

Volume 6 (2014): Issue 39 (November 2014)

Volume 6 (2014): Issue 38 (May 2014)

Volume 5 (2013): Issue 37 (November 2013)

Volume 5 (2013): Issue 36 (October 2013)
Book symposium on François Recanati’s Mental Files

Volume 5 (2013): Issue 35 (May 2013)

Volume 4 (2012): Issue 34 (December 2012)

Volume 4 (2012): Issue 33 (November 2012)

Volume 4 (2012): Issue 32 (May 2012)
New Perspectives on Quine’s “Word and Object”

Volume 4 (2011): Issue 31 (November 2011)

Volume 4 (2011): Issue 30 (May 2011)
XII Taller d'Investigació en Filosofia

Volume 4 (2010): Issue 29 (November 2010)
Petrus Hispanus 2009

Volume 3 (2010): Issue 28 (May 2010)

Volume 3 (2009): Issue 27 (November 2009)
Homage to M. S. Lourenço

Volume 3 (2009): Issue 26 (May 2009)

Volume 3 (2008): Issue 25 (November 2008)

Volume 2 (2008): Issue 24 (May 2008)

Volume 2 (2007): Issue 23 (November 2007)
Normativity and Rationality

Volume 2 (2007): Issue 22 (May 2007)

Volume 2 (2006): Issue 21 (November 2006)

Volume 1 (2006): Issue 20 (May 2006)

Volume 1 (2005): Issue 19 (November 2005)

Volume 1 (2005): Issue 18 (May 2005)

Volume 1 (2004): Issue 17 (November 2004)

Volume 1 (2004): Issue 16 (May 2004)

Volume 1 (2003): Issue 15 (November 2003)

Volume 1 (2003): Issue 14 (May 2003)

Volume 1 (2002): Issue 13 (November 2002)

Volume 1 (2001): Issue 11 (November 2001)

Volume 1 (2002): Issue 11-12 (May 2002)

Volume 1 (2001): Issue 10 (May 2001)

Volume 1 (2000): Issue 9 (November 2000)

Volume 1 (2000): Issue 8 (May 2000)

Volume 1 (1999): Issue 7 (November 1999)

Volume 1 (1999): Issue 6 (May 1999)

Volume 1 (1998): Issue 5-1 (June 1998)
Special Issue: Language, Logic and Mind Forum, Guest Editors: Joao Branquinho; M. S. Lourenço

Volume 1 (1998): Issue 5-2 (November 1998)
Special Issue: Petrus Hispanus Lectures 1998: o Mental e o Físico, Guest Editors: Joao Branquinho; M. S. Lourenço

Volume 1 (1998): Issue 4 (May 1998)

Volume 1 (1997): Issue 3 (November 1997)

Volume 1 (1997): Issue 2 (May 1997)

Volume 1 (1996): Issue 1 (December 1996)

Journal Details
Format
Journal
eISSN
2182-2875
First Published
01 Dec 1996
Publication timeframe
4 times per year
Languages
English, Portuguese

Search

Volume 1 (2002): Issue 11-12 (May 2002)

Journal Details
Format
Journal
eISSN
2182-2875
First Published
01 Dec 1996
Publication timeframe
4 times per year
Languages
English, Portuguese

Search

0 Articles
Open Access

Referência E Denotação: Duas Funções Semânticas Irredutíveis

Published Online: 31 Dec 2018
Page range: 2 - 21

Abstract

Open Access

Foundationalism and the Regress Argument

Published Online: 31 Dec 2018
Page range: 22 - 36a

Abstract

Open Access

The Logic of Constructivism

Published Online: 31 Dec 2018
Page range: 37 - 42

Abstract

Abstract

In this paper I dispute the current view that intuitionistic logic is the common basis for the three main trends of constructivism in the philosophy of mathematics: intuitionism, Russian constructivism and Bishop’s constructivism. The point is that the so-called ‘Markov’s principle’, which is accepted by Russian constructivists and rejected by the other two, is expressible in intuitionistic first-order logic, and so it appears to have the status of a logical principle. The result of appending this principle to a complete intuitionistic axiom system for first-order predicate logic constitutes a new logic, which could well be called ‘Markov’s logic’, and which should be regarded as the true logical system underlying Russian constructivism.

Open Access

Justification and Ways of Believing

Published Online: 31 Dec 2018
Page range: 42 - 53

Abstract

Open Access

Critical Notice Embodied Cognition and Correspondence Truth: A Reply to Lakoff and Johnson

Published Online: 31 Dec 2018
Page range: 53 - 61

Abstract

Open Access

Notícia

Published Online: 31 Dec 2018
Page range: 61 - 62

Abstract

0 Articles
Open Access

Referência E Denotação: Duas Funções Semânticas Irredutíveis

Published Online: 31 Dec 2018
Page range: 2 - 21

Abstract

Open Access

Foundationalism and the Regress Argument

Published Online: 31 Dec 2018
Page range: 22 - 36a

Abstract

Open Access

The Logic of Constructivism

Published Online: 31 Dec 2018
Page range: 37 - 42

Abstract

Abstract

In this paper I dispute the current view that intuitionistic logic is the common basis for the three main trends of constructivism in the philosophy of mathematics: intuitionism, Russian constructivism and Bishop’s constructivism. The point is that the so-called ‘Markov’s principle’, which is accepted by Russian constructivists and rejected by the other two, is expressible in intuitionistic first-order logic, and so it appears to have the status of a logical principle. The result of appending this principle to a complete intuitionistic axiom system for first-order predicate logic constitutes a new logic, which could well be called ‘Markov’s logic’, and which should be regarded as the true logical system underlying Russian constructivism.

Open Access

Justification and Ways of Believing

Published Online: 31 Dec 2018
Page range: 42 - 53

Abstract

Open Access

Critical Notice Embodied Cognition and Correspondence Truth: A Reply to Lakoff and Johnson

Published Online: 31 Dec 2018
Page range: 53 - 61

Abstract

Open Access

Notícia

Published Online: 31 Dec 2018
Page range: 61 - 62

Abstract