Volume 5 (2015): Issue 1 (February 2015)

The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership represents a strategic vision of transatlantic relations, including job creation, global leadership, and establishing high international standards. This paper discusses how three recent bi-lateral and regional agreements, along with positions adopted in transatlantic negotiations, convey respective side's acceptable parameters, and how international standards are emerging from and disseminated through agreements involving the European Union and the United States

This article addresses the Council presidency trio mechanism codified in the Lisbon Treaty with a particular focus on the continuity question in the Council's decision-making framework. The aim of the article is to explore the effect of the formalised trio programme on continuity in the Council's decision-making process. To this end, the article looks at how the trio mechanism has evolved over time and how it functions in practice.

While some analysts have been sceptical about the usefulness of the trio programme, these findings demonstrate that the launch of this institutional tool has improved the continuity in the Council's decision-making process. The positive effect on continuity results from three main factors-the trio programme as a formal tool in the Council's institutional tool-kit; the existence of political will among the presidencies to cooperate; and, lastly, the guiding role of the Council Secretariat. The article presents evidence gathered by tracing the preparations of joint trio programmes from 2007 to 2012.

As economic stagnation continues to mark the EU in the fifth year of the euro zone crisis, political support for integration is waning. The European Parliament elections of 2014 returned a hitherto unparalleled number of Eurosceptic MEPs, with EU-critical parties becoming the largest ones in several Member States. Much of this Euroscepticism is driven by economic polarisation between core and peripheral countries. While an increasing number of voters in the northwestern creditor countries resent having to foot the bill for what they consider economic mismanagement in the periphery, voters in peripheral countries increasingly rebel against what they deem to be an economically catastrophic Diktat from Germany and its allies. Continued political support for European integration will hinge on successful income convergence in the EU but the current dilemma is that such policies might not be politically feasible. Periods of rapid convergence would seem to suggest that success depends on two main policy strategies. First, a monetary policy that promotes credit for productive purposes, leaves inflation control to other instruments, and employs selective credit rationing to prevent asset booms. Second, a vertical industrial policy prioritising selected industrial sectors. The first policy conflicts with the present framework of euro zone monetary policy, but that framework was only installed in the first place because many peripheral countries were desperately in search of an external constraint on domestic distributional conflict. Industrial policies, in turn, require a sufficient degree of state autonomy from business elites in order to be effective, but it is highly questionable whether most states in the EU possess such autonomy. Though there are, as yet hesitant, signs of a reorientation of both monetary and cohesion policy in the EU, the question of the institutional and political preconditions for their successful implementation has been largely neglected.

Against the context of the evolution of the European Union's association agreements as transformative tools beyond the organizational boundaries, this article seeks to develop an account for understanding legislative and regulatory approximation mechanisms as the essential elements for the exercise of the Union's normative and regulatory impact. It therefore distinguishes between both concepts and provides a legal and political science explorations of what the legislative and regulatory approximations are, and what are their substantial rationale and procedural features in the context of ‘gradualist’ convergence approach enshrined in the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement.

Several reforms aiming to strengthen budgetary discipline in the European Union have been implemented since the outbreak of the European debt crisis. Arguably the most important one is the Fiscal Compact, which stipulates that each signatory country must enshrine in domestic legislation an upper limit on the structural budget deficit, that is, the deficit after cyclical and other temporary factors have been excluded. This paper analyses the contents of the Fiscal Compact and discusses challenges for its implementation and efficacy. The conclusion is that the Fiscal Compact may be challenging to implement and enforce because the rules are very complex and require complicated calculations that are subject to very large forecasting uncertainty. The Fiscal Compact could, however, lead to a stronger national commitment to fiscal prudence.

The development of a formerly poor state in a great European power to a rich state in a small European country is remarkable. But the interest of this article is mainly on the methodology which is based on the exclusive focus on three key periods in the history of the observed region. This methodology leads to a very specific understanding of development and economic growth. The periods chosen in this example are the five years before the First World War, as it was a period of development and growth that in the end led to the fundamental crisis in the 20th century. The second period consists of five years following the Second World War. This period was crucial, as many fundamental developments were laid in this time. The final period begins with another big economic crisis in 2008. The selection is based on three rationales. First, it allows a comparison of how the population deals with crisis. Second, it provides a cross-section of over hundred years, and third, the topicality of these years increase the relevance of the paper.

The article presents problematic issues resulting from the Polish presence on the historical eastern border of the II Rzeczpospolita (Republic of Poland), or, as it is called in the Polish national discourse, “Kresy”. The notion of Kresy, to a certain extent, corresponds to the notion of ‘borderland’. However, the latter is neutral and used mostly in scientific discourse, whereas the former alludes to Polish national awareness in literature and much of the historical writings and presents itself as the lost centre of “Polishness”. This way, contemporary Polish historical memory makes substantial claims towards this space, both in a geographical and historical sense, while hardly tolerating the presence of indigenous, non-Polish populations inhabiting the area- Lithuanians, Belarusians, and Ukrainians. In order to revise these issues in the article, I have adopted a postcolonial studies perspective. Looking at Poland through the lens of postcolonial studies reveals that it holds a unique position due to its double status. Historically speaking, Poland occupied both the position of the colonizer and of the colonized. However, popular Polish imagination tends to see Poland only in its role of the oppressed victims of its powerful ibjesial neighbours. The dominant role of Poland and its version of colonial policy adopted towards its contemporary eastern neighbours is obscured or simply denied both in popular and scientific discourse. The analysis of the role of the “myth of Kresy”, proposed here, hopes to contribute to the understanding of the implications of the Polish contemporary “orientalism”.

On 15 November 2012, at the plenary session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Xi Jinping was elected the Party' general secretary, whereas he also became the chairman of the influential Central Military Commission. Too eager to wait to be inaugurated as President of the People' Republic of China in March 2013, the new national leader announced that in the following decade he is guided by the main objective of his predecessor Hu Jintao to double the prosperity of the people by the year 2020 and to keep the country' economy stable and growing fast. Unfortunately, it will be difficult for the new leader of China to implement his intentions, since, presumably, the country' new leadership will be from the older generation, hardliners, and, most importantly, politically conservative. But the difficulties lie in carrying out economic reforms because of rampant corruption and shadow banking in the central apparatus and in regions.

According to the World Bank' analysis, China has become the world' largest economy. But the large expenditures to military reform and environmental protection are not sufficient for Xi Jinping to accomplish the goal to raise significantly the poor living standards of Chinese people. China has also faced difficulties in complying with the basic principles of its foreign policy, especially after the annexation of Crimea and its incorporation into the Russian Federation by China' strategic partner, Russia. In the past, China has carried out campaigns against “Americanization”, although with no tangible results. Thus, the leaders of today' China are faced with a number of dilemmas.