<abstract><title style='display:none'>Abstract</title>Walter Benjamin pointed out the affinity of cinema and architecture, and argued unexpectedly that tbese art forms are both essentially tactile arts. The tactility of the material art of building is not difficult to grasp, but the idea that a cinematic projection could result in fundamentally tactile experience certainly meets objections. However, the philosophical as well as neurological studies ofthe past few decades in perception, emotion, and thought, as well as in artistic expressions, suggest that these two arts, or poetic images at large, address ali our senses, including our synthesizing existential sense, all at once. The arts communicate through the “fiesh of the world”, to use a notion of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. The acts of perception, feeling, thinking, and memorizing cal! for the reality and sense of embodiment. We identify ourselves unknowingly with constructed architectural spaces as well as projected cinematic situations with our empathetic capacity. So, Benjamin ‘s argument could be re- -formulated: cinema and architecture are embodied atis in which the externa! and the internal are fully intertwined and fused. “The world is wholly inside, and 1 aro wholly outside myself’, as Merleau-Ponty enigmatically argues.</abstract>

The Existential Image: Lived Space in Cinema and Architecture

<abstract><title style='display:none'>Abstract</title>In this contribution, the relationship between work and leisure is investigated from a phenomenological viewpoint. The insights of Michel Henry and his interpretations of the work of Karl Marx are prominent. Marx makes a distinction between objective and subjective work. It is especially the second sphere, on which Henry elaborates his phenomenology of the living body, as experience of life itself. Work is the mode of <italic>pathos.</italic> After this introduction, the question of the phenomenology of leisure is being posed. The phenomenological zero-point of leisure is the night, in which we sleep. The invisibility in the night is the starting point to reveal the essence of leisure. The phenomenological mode of night, rest, is sleep. Further, in this line, the problem of vacation, time spending on not-working as obsession is of importance for our society today. From the point of view of henriana phenomenology, some notable conclusion can be formulated.</abstract>

Travail et loisir

<abstract>
<title style='display:none'>Abstract</title>
This article undertakes a comparative study of Ingarden and Derrida in regards to literature. It is being shown that the former’s concepts of ‘spots of indeterminacy’ and ‘empty spots’ resemble the latter’s notions of ‘spacing’ and ‘blanks’. Yet, although they both share a background in Husserlian phenomenology, it is argued that their ideas can hardly be equated to one another. Moreover, Derrida seemed to have avoided any association with Ingarden. This is due to their fundamentally different take on the literary work. Whereas Ingarden mainly considered the ontological nature of literature, Derrida took into account the broader context of the world in which literature takes place. For Ingarden, Derrida would have strayed too far from the subject matter. For Derrida, Ingarden hardly understood its complexity and only examined a small fragment of the issue: the question what makes us grasp literature as such. To Ingarden, those aspects were essential. To Derrida, they were merely objective rules.
</abstract>

Ingarden and Derrida on empty space in literature

O espelho equívoco. O núcleo filosófico da <italic>Spiegel-Interview</italic> a Martin Heidegger

A ideia de Fenomenologia em Heidegger e Husserl. Fenomenologia Hermenêutica do Aí-Ser e Fenomenologia Reflexiva da Consciência

O Meu Caminho Na Fenomenologia

<abstract>
<title style='display:none'>Abstract</title>
In this article, I intend to show, first of all, that the metaphysical neutrality of the <italic>Logical Investigations</italic> leads to untenable consequences and even threatens the coherence of Husserl's project. In truth, Husserl's distinction between phenomenology and metaphysics and its corollary, the pure and simple exclusion of metaphysical problems - such as that of the reality of the so-called external world - from the field of nascent phenomenology, make it impossible to give a satisfactory form to a problem as central to this new discipline as that of perception. However, my final word will not be on the indis-soluble link between the problems that phenomenology poses for itself and those that Husserl would like to be able to "purify" it from the outset. However permeable the boundaries between these two general directions of research may be, phenomenology and metaphysics are not equivalent. Phenomenology can even be said to contribute to formulating and solving certain metaphysical problems, starting with the idealism/realism antithesis. It is to this contribution that I will devote the second part of these reflections.
</abstract>

Idéalisme/réalisme : une distinction métaphysique ?

<abstract>
<title style='display:none'>Abstract</title>
The same subjectivity that makes the world appear belongs, as an integral part, to that which it makes appear, so that there is no alternative between the phenomenological involvement of the world by subjectivity and the ontological involvement of subjectivity by the world. These are the two faces, already abstract, of a fundamental and original situation, in other words, a primitive fact or an archifact. We have thus transported the correlation to the terrain of the world in the form of a double position of the subject, which I have further formulated metaphorically through the distinction between being before and being within. So, what does it mean to belong to the world, or rather, what are the senses of belonging implied by the fundamental situation we have just described?
</abstract>

O absoluto fenomenológico

Introduction : La phénoménologie française vers la métaphysique

<abstract>
<title style='display:none'>Abstract</title>
This article examines the relationship between French phenomenology of art and metaphysics. More specifically, it highlights four points. Firstly, French phenomenological aesthetics is characterized by a certain ignorance of the renewal of artistic questioning initiated by Anglo-Saxon aesthetics. Secondly, French phenomenology of art is a metaphysics of art, which considers that works of art contain an ontological (cosmophanic or theophanic) revelation. Thirdly, French phenomenology of art is part of the “theological turn of French phenomenology”. Authors tend towards theology or “cosmotheology”. Fourthly, French phenomenology of art, which is a metaphysics of the sensible, possesses the theoretical means to think philosophically about conceptual art.
</abstract>

French Phenomenology of Art and Metaphysics

<abstract>
<title style='display:none'>Abstract</title>
In this article, I intend to show, first of all, that the metaphysical neutrality of the <italic>Logical Investigations</italic> leads to untenable consequences and even threatens the coherence of Husserl's project. In truth, Husserl's distinction between phenomenology and metaphysics and its corollary, the pure and simple exclusion of metaphysical problems - such as that of the reality of the so-called external world - from the field of nascent phenomenology, make it impossible to give a satisfactory form to a problem as central to this new discipline as that of perception. However, my final word will not be on the indissoluble link between the problems that phenomenology poses for itself and those that Husserl would like to be able to “purify” it from the outset. However permeable the boundaries between these two general research directions may be, phenomenology and metaphysics are not equivalent. Phenomenology can even be said to contribute to formulating and solving certain metaphysical problems, starting with the idealism/realism antithesis. It is to this contribution that I will devote the second part of these reflections.
</abstract>

Idealism/realism: A metaphysical distinction?

<abstract>
<title style='display:none'>Abstract</title>
The recent liberation of phenomenology’s “metaphysical” word seems to us to present a twofold risk: on the one hand, that of leading us to lose in intension what they will have made us gain in extension - what exactly does the term “metaphysical” mean here, and can we even hope to provide an exact definition? On the other hand, it would convert our former reservations, which may indeed have been excessive, into a temerity that would ultimately be no less so. The aim we have set ourselves here must therefore be modest: to attempt to avert this twofold risk by first equipping ourselves with a clear and unambiguous concept of what is or could legitimately be understood by the term “phenomenological metaphysics; to show then how and why phenomenology, rightly or wrongly, but without really realizing what was preventing it from doing so, has never really managed to do so; to indicate finally the question that a “phenomenological metaphysics” conforming to its concept would have to ask, and to which it would have to commit itself to answer.
</abstract>

The Other of Correlation (Small Prolegomena to any Future Phenomenological Metaphysics)

<abstract><title style='display:none'>Abstract</title>There is a paradox that lies at the heart of every investigation of normality, namely, its dependence on its other (e.g., deviation, break, difference). In this paper, I want to show that this paradox is the reason for the dynamism as well as fragility of normality. In this regard, I will not only argue that every normality is fragile, but also that normality can only be established because it is fragile. In the first part of this paper, I will present and re-visit Husserl’s account of normality as concordant and optimal with regard to its dynamic or fragile aspects. In the second part of this paper, I will apply this account to recent findings in phenomenological pathology regarding schizophrenia and depression to show how Husserl’s account could be helpful for differentiating between different aspects (such as concordance and optimality) as well as genetic levels of (disturbances of) normality.</abstract>

‘There Is a Crack in Everything’. Fragile Normality : Husserl’s Account of Normality Re-Visited

<abstract>
<title style='display:none'>Abstract</title>
In this short piece I am not undertaking to give a full discussion of the whole of Patočka’s “heretical” work. I wish only make clear its most essential core. What, in Patočka’s view, made Europe <italic>Europe</italic> and what is Europe’s bequest to the world after what Patočka describes as its fall, completed by the two world wars? What should Europe look to conserve in itself if- as seems likely - it would like to once again play a respected role in world events? Is there something which the globalised world should take over from old Europe, or something which it should eschew, if it does not wish history to end and utter decadence to ensue?
</abstract>

The Heretical Conception of the European Heritage in the Late Essays of Jan Patočka

<abstract><title style='display:none'>Abstract</title>This article reconstructs the development of Husserl’s definition of metaphysics as the ultimate science of reality in the courses and lectures written up to the year 1905. The analysis of these texts casts light on Husserl’s philosophical self-understanding in the wider context of late Nineteenth Century German philosophy as well as on the fundamental role that metaphysical interests played in the development of his thought from its earliest stage. A particular attention is devoted to Husserl’s early views about the relation between the theory of knowledge and metaphysics, whose analysis is a necessary preliminary step to address the theoretical issue of the relation between transcendental phenomenology and metaphysics.</abstract>

Husserl’s Early Concept of Metaphysics As the Ultimate Science of Reality

<abstract><title style='display:none'>Abstract</title><bold>The notion of Befindlichkeit in Heidegger’s phenomenological way</bold>. Heidegger’s phenomenology of <italic>Befindlichkeit</italic> and the different kinds of affection was initiated still before <italic>Being and Time,</italic> and developed in its essential features till the end of the 1930’s. The current paper argues that, since its very origins in a philosophical framework, back to the translation of the <italic>affectiones</italic> in Augustine, the notion of <italic>Befindlichkeit</italic> sets the beginning of a structural understanding of existence - displayed both at the ontological levei of <italic>Grundstimmungen</italic> (such as anguish, boredom or reservedness), and at the ontic level of different factual <italic>Stimmungen.</italic> Any comprehensive analysis of those affections counts on a tripie background with a <italic>Wovor,</italic> a <italic>Worum</italic> and the full-fledged exercise <italic>(Vollzug)</italic> of such and such affective understanding. In <italic>Being and Time</italic> this analysis is dedicated to <italic>fear,</italic> in its different nuances. But this phenomenon was already dealt with in Heidegger’s Lectures on Augustine (1921) and will reoccur in the <italic>Beiträge</italic> (1936-38). A reading of this conceptual evolution will here ground a defense of the phenomenological character of Heidegger’s way of thinking.</abstract>

The notion of Befindlichkeit in Heidegger's phenomenological way.

<abstract>
<title style='display:none'>Abstract</title>
What are fictional emotions and what has phenomenology to say about them? This paper argues that the experience of fictional emotions entails a splitting of the subject between a real and a phantasy ego. The real ego is the ego that imagines something; the phantasy ego is the ego that is necessarily co-posited by any experience of imagining something. Fictional emotions are phantasy emotions of the phantasy ego. The intentional structure of fictional emotions, the nature of their fictional object, as well as the process of constituting the phantasy ego in representificational acts of consciousness are further elaborated to provide the groundwork for a phenomenological analysis of fictional emotions.
</abstract>

Towards a Phenomenological Analysis of Fictional Emotions

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Phainomenon

Journal of Phenomenological Philosophy

Phainomenon is an international journal specializing in phenomenology.  It was founded in 2000 and has been published since then with the support of the Center of Philosophy of the...

Phainomenon is an international journal specializing in phenomenology.  It was founded in 2000 and has been published since then with the support of...

Phainomenon

Journal of Phenomenological Philosophy

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