Volumen 2 (2015): Heft 1 (June 2015)

The discussion raised by the Glăveanu target paper (Glăveanu, 2014) continues in the second issue of “Creativity. Theories – Research – Applications” (CTRA). In this editorial I focus on two elements shared by commentators whose articles are presented in this issue, namely: creative potential and its measurement. I start with the observation that potential is probably the most fuzzy and poorly defined construct in the creativity literature (and likely social science as a whole). As a result of different operationalizations of this category, its valid and reliable measurement is difficult – though not impossible – but, more importantly, several different theories of potential are being developed simultaneously. I focus mainly on critiques of the measurement of creative potential and show how recent developments in psychometrics make it more valid and reliable than critics tend to realize.

Glăveanu’s target article is indeed timely and thought provoking. This commentary argues that Glăveanu needs not to be criticised in regard to stances taken, but rather be encouraged to expand his scope further. I suggest that this should be done by addressing the need for inter-disciplinary knowledge synthesis and also by recognising and exploring the social dynamics (and politics) of the academic world. Researchers need to be knowledgeable with regard to both in order to further an understanding of creativity and also to apply research findings responsibly.

This commentary examines the social perspective on creativity, as presented in the featured article. There are several attractive aspects to the social perspective, but serious limitations as well, which are detailed in this commentary. The assumptions of the social perspective are also discussed. The most questionable of these assumes that social recognition and impact are inherent parts of creativity. The parsimonious alternative is to define creativity such that it includes only what is related to creativity per se and to recognize that social recognition may follow creation and is certainly extricable from it. A defence of this parsimonious view is presented. A brief discussion of possible crises in the field of creativity studies is also presented, with one suggestion being that the diverse approaches used in the field represent a kind of divergent thinking and as such represent progress, even though it is not linear. This commentary concludes with a discussion about creativity being vital for quality of life. That perspective differs dramatically from the product view of creativity which is often tied to a social perspective.

In this commentary, I applaud Glăveanu’s attempts to shake things up and introduce some much-needed disruption into the study of creativity. Glăveanu is a “ big thinker” and he is correct to worry about the growing fragmentation of the field. I share his concern that the so-called “ social psychology of creativity” really isn’t all that social. Most researchers and theorists continue to decontextualize creativity, giving little attention to the cultural and environmental factors that contribute to creativity of performance. Yet Glăveanu also presents some arguments with which I disagree. Most striking is his apparent misunderstanding of the purpose and functioning of the Consensual Assessment Technique (CAT). In addition, I am less surprised than is Glăveanu about the current state of our field. The same narrowing of research questions plagues every branch of the study of psychology. However, the tides may be changing. At the forefront of a reform movement are a number of creativity theorists and journal editors. My own hope is that as researchers are given license to expand their work to include a wide variety of experimental designs, methodologies and contexts, they will adopt as their core mission the promotion of the growth of creativity at the individual, group, societal and multi-cultural levels.

The commentary confirms and builds on Glăveanu’s critical scrutiny of the current stage of creativity research. The need for more actors, theories, methods and definitions will not be fulfilled until critical reflection concerning what has been done and synthesis between different research attempts are achieved. The authors first expand the creativity stage by discussing what will happen in creativity research attempts if we alternate with a “ she, you and they” perspective? They then present a new definition of creativity. Creativity is seen as a collective, generative, novel way of experiencing reality ending with the idea of a shared product that is evaluated as creative in a relevant context. This definition is in line with the development of a new creativity tool or measurement, the Test for Distributed Creativity in Organizational Groups (DOG). The DOG can be used both for measuring the products of creative groups and investigating their processes.

Based on Glăveanu’s target article, issues raised about the psychometric approach to creativity research are examined. Criticisms of divergent thinking tests, such as the unusual uses of an object test, are examined. Arguments supporting the theoretical and practical utility of divergent thinking tests are presented. It is furthermore suggested that tests are best conceived and used in contextualized ways. The example of measures of divergent thinking which were designed for managers is presented. Finally, the psychometric approach encompasses many aspects of creativity beyond divergent thinking, as illustrated by recent work on the evaluation of creative potential (the EPoC battery). In the EPoC assessment, both divergent-exploratory thinking and convergent-integrative thinking are measured in a range of contextual domains, such as the visual-graphic, verballiterary, social problem solving ones. This work contrasts with the simplistic, and restrictive view of the unusual uses of an object test as the epitome of the psychometric approach to creativity.

This text is devoted to a discussion of current achievements in the psychology of creativity, as well as to the further development of the field. It is concerned with a criticism of former and current theses in the field of the psychology of creativity discussed by Glăveanu (2014). The arguments presented indicate that, despite Glăveanu’s (2014) proposition, the psychology of creativity is not in crisis. It is pointed out that the difference in views between supporters of the social psychology approach to creativity and psychology researchers oriented towards the study of creative potential on how to conduct creativity research, stems from a concentration on different levels of creativity, and not necessarily from an ineffective theory of creativity. As a consequence of these different perceptions of creativity at its particular levels, determining the prime standard of creative potential is not sufficient to understand the social conditioning of creative activity and the social assessment of creativity, and vice versa.

This commentary will take the form of a critical examination into the six research gaps identified by Glăveanu (2014a) in the article The Psychology of Creativity: A Critical Reading by examining carefully whether the proposed criticisms are supported by research evidence and will attempt to focus the discussion on accumulating knowledge of theories in the psychology of education. To consolidate theory construction in the psychology of creativity, researchers should give concise operational definitions that can be examined by reliable and valid measurements with identifiable units of analysis in general or specific participants. Given explicit evidence of this kind, educators can be best informed about how to define, assess, and develop human creativity when applying these theories.

The first premise is that creativity requires a focal perceiver perspective to be determined or assigned. As criteria for perception or judgment, what we currently consider “dimensions” of creativity instead may be “precursors.” Ultimately, creativity shifts meaning for the whole culture. The second premise is that creativity requires a temporal perspective: its assessment is time-dependent on the first instance the perceiver notices. If the perceiver accepts the creative “ it,” then it is shared for others to judge it, creating a diffusion and adaptation process. The strongest form of creativity, then, is when it stands the test of time, goes beyond its own zeitgeist, and is institutionalized for future generations.

The present paper argues that crisis talk has been rampant in psychology since its beginning. This is so because it serves a powerful rhetorical function – ‘if we are in crisis we must do x to get out of it’. In fact, being in crisis is the state of any progressive discipline, where new evidence is brought to light and new ideas are put on offer. This paper then turns to the specific conceptual and methodological issues facing the psychology of creativity and offers some suggestions for moving the sub-discipline forward. It proposes dropping the study of ‘creativity’ as a noun, and instead focusing on the concrete process of creating and evaluating the products of that activity.

In recent years, a move towards social, cultural-psychological and distributed research perspectives on creativity has been witnessed within the social- and human sciences. Glăveanu is one of the most prominent advocates for this new line of research. In the present commentary, I will share my concerns as to why this move is important and vital for the field of creativity research, but I will also raise my sense of fear by the proposed direction of model unity and coherence as suggested by Glăveanu. On the contrary, we may need to tolerate and respect the diversity of perspectives and enjoy the fruits of cross-disciplinarily research, not needing to reach any state of unity. In this sense, a way out of ‘crisis’ could be that we respect, variations and even differences, and instead of coherence establish meeting places and spots where divergent perspectives can be celebrated.

In responding to Glăveanu’s critical views on the psychology of creativity, this commentary summarizes seminal work that has been carried out on creativity since 1950s. It underscores the value of the systems approach and discusses key methodological issues related to this approach, including creativity assessment, the necessity for multi-level analyses, the bandwidth-fidelity-dilemma, the challenge of operationalizing creativity for empirical studies and the lack of communication across disciplines. It calls for more external support, cross-disciplinary and cross-cultural collaboration and the establishment of a more open, tolerant and creativity-conducive environment to encourage and unleash creativity in creativity research from creativity researchers.

In this commentary an indispensable aspect of creativity, knowing creativity, is articulated as a response to Glăveanu’s (2014) inquiry into advancement of the field of the psychology of creativity. Connotations of knowing are presented such as perceiving and understanding ourselves within our environment. Accordingly, knowing creativity is about genuinely seeing, sensing, feeling, and relating creativity for self and the common good.

In this commentary, I raise an etiological question, which has been virtually excluded from the horizon of contemporary scholarship. In spite of a long history of philosophical, mystical, and religious approaches considering the transcendent and/or spiritual sources of human creativity, mainstream creativity researchers have become gradually reluctant to acknowledge the supernatural influences in this human endeavour. This account is either disregarded altogether or re-interpreted in a way that substitutes supernatural connections with observable and measurable processes. On the one hand, the latter approach appears to fall within the premises of modern science and thereby earns substantial attention the scientific community. On the other, this could be one of the reasons why creativity research has reached its epistemological cul-de-sac. I argue that by retaining the source of creativity within an individual, one annihilates the whole constellation of personality traits and processes, which have transcendent characteristics. It is important to integrate the study of transcendent experience into the study of cognitive, personality, and environmental underpinnings of creative faculties. A possible direction for this change is offered by transpersonal psychology, which makes an attempt to resurrect an investigation of spiritual reality and integrate it in the study of modern psychology. At the end of the commentary, I sketch a transcendental model of creativity developed along the lines of a transpersonal paradigm.

I fully subscribe to Glăveanu’s opinions. I am not a psychologist, but as someone who specialises in culture and at the same time, as a poet, I believe that if the psychology of creativity is to say something truthful about the creative process, it should open up to the inner life of artists and to statistically unmeasurable processes such as talent and inspiration, rather than devise and carry out laboratory experiments. Therefore, encouraged by Glăveanu to pose innovative questions, in my article I ask about the essence of poetic inspiration, that is able to create images and lies at the root of metaphor which emerges in the mind of an artist.

Creativity studies seem to be a stronghold for individual-based psychological theories. The reasons for this are numerous and complex and, among them, we can identify certain limited or counter-productive ways of conceptualising the social. In this reply to comments I address both the status of the social in creativity studies and the dichotomies that follow from adopting an external view of society and culture. Among them, the separation between creative potential and achievement is particularly problematic, as it constructs a reified, static, and individual notion of potential, reflected in the measurement of divergent thinking. I propose, towards the end, a perspectival model of creativity that radically socialises divergent thinking by placing the social at the core rather than the periphery of creative production. Finally, I suggest that including time into our theory and research holds the key to overcoming many of the false dichotomies that underline creativity studies, at least in psychology. A thoroughly social perspective on creativity might seem like a daring or foolish endeavour but it is, in my view, also the most promising.