rss_2.0Journal of Military Studies FeedSciendo RSS Feed for Journal of Military Studieshttps://sciendo.com/journal/JMShttps://www.sciendo.comJournal of Military Studies 's Coverhttps://sciendo-parsed-data-feed.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/60072aa7fd113962cb04b0fc/cover-image.jpg?X-Amz-Algorithm=AWS4-HMAC-SHA256&X-Amz-Date=20211017T022834Z&X-Amz-SignedHeaders=host&X-Amz-Expires=604800&X-Amz-Credential=AKIA6AP2G7AKDOZOEZ7H%2F20211017%2Feu-central-1%2Fs3%2Faws4_request&X-Amz-Signature=e7d3ce8d6498dcb6ec81f7243a4bddb8b47459b2da379e8d5994113e930ff5e5200300Nuclear warfare beyond counterforcehttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/jms-2021-0012<abstract><title style='display:none'>Abstract</title><p>A counterforce attack intends to disable an opponent's nuclear arsenal to limit potential damage from that adversary. We postulate a future when hardening and deeply burying fixed sites, transition to mobile strategic systems, and improved defences make executing a counterforce strategy against an adversary's nuclear forces extremely difficult. Additionally, our postulated future has multiple nations possessing nuclear weapons. Consequently, each country needs to consider multiple actors when addressing the question of how to deter a potential adversary's nuclear attack. We examine six nuclear targeting alternatives and consider how to deter them. These strategies include nuclear demonstration, conventional military targets, and attacks consisting of communications/electronics, economic, infrastructure, and population centers that a nation might consider striking with nuclear weapons. Since these alternative strikes require only a few nuclear weapons, executing one of them would not significantly shift the balance of nuclear forces. The attacking country's remaining nuclear forces may inhibit the attacked country or its allies from responding. How can nations deter these limited nuclear attacks? Potentially, threatening economic counter-strikes seems to be the best alternative. How might escalation be controlled in the event of a limited attack? Other instruments of power, such as political or economic, might be employed to bolster deterrence against these types of nuclear strikes.</p></abstract>ARTICLE2021-10-09T00:00:00.000+00:00Greece as a frontline state in the historical longue duréehttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/jms-2021-0010<abstract><title style='display:none'>Abstract</title><p>Greece as a state in South-eastern Europe and the Mediterranean has perceived itself as a frontline state, especially after it became a NATO member in 1952 along with Turkey. The two states formed the south-eastern flank of NATO and along with Iran constituted the Greece, Turkey, Iran (GTI) Corridor, part of Rimland. Greece’s strategic value stemmed from its frontline position in relation to the Eastern Bloc. After the dissolution of the Eastern Bloc, Greece has reinvented itself as a frontline state, this time in the Mediterranean Sea. We use the historical notion of longue durée and loci of Classical Geopolitics, such as Heartland and Rimland, to assess Greece’s strategic value in the long period. We also propose an additional spatial unity, the New Rimland.</p></abstract>ARTICLE2021-10-01T00:00:00.000+00:00Military thoracic gunshot wounds: A systematic reviewhttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/jms-2021-0009<abstract><title style='display:none'>Abstract</title><p>A systematic review of the literature was carried out using the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA) method to investigate the frequency of military thoracic gunshot wounds (GSWs) and deaths in combat theatres since World War Two (WW2). An electronic database search of World of Science, Scopus, Science Direct, PubMed and Microsoft Academic was conducted using the keywords ‘combat, casualties, thorax, gunshot, and military’ to identify peer-reviewed journals and conference papers on the topic. Twenty-three sources relevant to this review were identified and covered multiple theatres of operation. While there is a downward trend in the frequency of thoracic GSWs and fatalities likely due to the improvement of body armour, the improvement in medical treatment and increased frequency of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), the review shows that the advancement has not removed the likelihood of thoracic GSWs, which still accounted for approximately 15% of all thoracic injuries in the most recent combat theatres. The systematic review identifies that GSWs of the thorax continue to be a risk in military theatres and therefore, medical personnel should be aware of the frequency and severity of thoracic GSWs and should be prepared to treat these life-threatening injuries, as timely intervention is essential.</p></abstract>ARTICLE2021-10-01T00:00:00.000+00:00Siting military base camps through an MCDA frameworkhttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/jms-2021-0011<abstract><title style='display:none'>Abstract</title><p>The process used to determine site suitability for military base camps lacks a formal framework for reducing relative risks to soldier safety and maximise mission effectiveness. Presently, military personnel responsible for determining site suitability of a base camp must assess large amounts of geographic, socioeconomic and logistical data, without a decision analysis framework to aid in the process. By adopting a multicriteria decision analysis (MCDA) framework to determine site suitability of base camps, battlespace commanders can make better, more defensible decisions. This paper surveys US Army officers with recent base camp experience to develop a set of initial criteria and weights relevant to base camp site selection. The developed decision framework is demonstrated using an MCDA methodology in an illustrative example to compare alternative base camp locations within a designated Area of Interest (AoI). Leveraging the site ranking output and/or criteria weights resulting from the methodology provides decision-making support that can be used in the field when time, resources and data may not be readily available.</p></abstract>ARTICLE2021-10-01T00:00:00.000+00:00Omnipotent, omniscient and omnipresent commanders: The impact of a cultural paradigm derived from a secularised Christianity on the philosophy of infocentric warfarehttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/jms-2021-0005<abstract><title style='display:none'>Abstract</title><p>This article examines how a religious cultural paradigm deriving from the Humanism of the West affects the modern art and science of War. It was in the framework of a religified Humanism, in which man ‘stole’ God’s capabilities and properties, that the worldview of man-god was created. This worldview permeated the development of military strategy, thereby facilitating its transformation in the worldview of a commander-god; this is the same worldview which today threatens to reach extremes, assisted by technological evolution allowing the development of robust C4ISR networks<fn id="j_jms-2021-0005_fn_001_w2aab3b7b1b1b6b1aab1c11b1b1Aa" symbol="1"><p>Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance. The acronym today is C5ISR, with the addition of Combat Systems.</p></fn> interconnected with precision guided munitions (PGMs) of various configurations. The article then examines the influence of Western intellectualism, which is a basic element of Western Christianity, over the development of modern theories and perceptions on military strategy and the risks that can arise for future Western armies from this impact. As an antidote to this influence, the article suggests a new perception on military strategy which emphasises adaptability and flexibility and is based on a cultural paradigm from the Orthodox Christian Faith.</p></abstract>ARTICLE2021-09-24T00:00:00.000+00:00Clausewitz and the partisan: Accounting for unlimited enmity in the twenty-first centuryhttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/jms-2021-0008<abstract><title style='display:none'>Abstract</title><p>Napoleon harnessed unlimited enmity to transform wars from limited ones to unlimited ones. Accordingly, Clausewitz developed the Trinity to describe this source of power. However, the increasing destruction due to interstate wars has led to a decrease in this type of conflict. At the same time, there has been an increase in partisan wars. The Trinity cannot explain partisan victories or state defeats. Using social psychology to explain the relationship of the partisan to the group, this research shows how partisans harness unlimited enmity to engage in existential wars. Furthering Clausewitzian philosophy, a new analogy, the singularity, is created to describe this power. Implications and conclusions drawn are at the end of the paper.</p></abstract>ARTICLE2021-09-24T00:00:00.000+00:00Advanced education for NCMs’ professional career development: a conclusive experience?https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/jms-2021-0007<abstract><title style='display:none'>Abstract</title><p>The purpose of this article is to present the results of a research which assessed whether the Knowledge Acquisition Programme and the Non-Commissioned Member Executive Professional Development Programme contributed to the Non-Commissioned Members’ effectiveness as senior leaders in the Profession of Arms within the Canadian Armed Forces. Thirty-seven Programme graduates from 2006 to 2015 received a questionnaire containing seven closed-ended general information questions and twelve open-ended programme/course specific questions. Seventeen graduates responded to the questionnaire. Manual coding was used to identify main themes and sub-themes. The research findings determined that both Programmes contributed to the effectiveness of senior leaders in the Profession of Arms within the Canadian Armed Forces. However, some caveats were expressed, and recommendations brought forward to enhance the Programme and to improve its future deliveries.</p></abstract>ARTICLE2021-09-24T00:00:00.000+00:00The Imperial Japanese Navy and the battle of the Philippine Sea: An analysis of the main causes of defeathttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/jms-2021-0006<abstract><title style='display:none'>Abstract</title><p>This article aims to demonstrate through mathematical analysis that the primary reason for the defeat of the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) in the battle of the Philippine Sea during World War II (WWII) was quantitative, and that the defeat is particularly attributable to the lack of force concentration. Scholars have placed much emphasis on the qualitative aspects of the forces involved, such as the skill of IJN pilots or the air defence capabilities of the United States Navy (USN), in seeking to explain the Japanese defeat. We, however, assert that in this naval battle, quantitative factors played a more important role than qualitative ones. Accordingly, we offer an improved version of the mathematical model of Armstrong and Powell, which was previously used to analyse battles between aircraft carriers (CVs). The coefficients in our mathematical model will then be estimated and verified using historical data from the main battles between CVs of the IJN and USN during WWII. Finally, we will analyse the factors underlying the IJN’s defeat in the Battle of the Philippine Sea using the model. This study proposes a useful technique for evaluating quantitative and qualitative aspects of naval forces.</p></abstract>ARTICLE2021-09-24T00:00:00.000+00:00Organizational challenges and leaders’ coping strategies: a qualitative study of Swedish military staff organizationhttps://sciendo.com/article/10.1515/jms-2017-0002<abstract> <title style='display:none'>Abstract</title> <p>Numerous societal change processes such as globalization, professionalization and social and technical acceleration have challenged military organizations. The aims of this study were to (1) gain a deeper understanding of coping strategies used by the military leaders at the strategic level to manage everyday organizational demands and (2) relate these strategies to multidisciplinary models of organizational challenges. Owing to an insufficiently developed base of research, an inductive approach was used. Interviews were performed with 23 Swedish brigadier generals and colonels. Five coping strategies were found for handling the negative organizational aspects: repair work, catching up, reproducing, using formal and informal strategies and managing loyalties. The theoretical concepts of narcissistic, anorectic and greedy organizations were used as a framework when interpreting the inductively generated coping strategies. It was suggested that the specific connection found between individual-level coping strategies and theoretically framed organizational challenges is new. The results of this study are discussed theoretically and may be valuable in educational settings when evaluating the working conditions and performance of high-level officers.</p> </abstract>ARTICLE2018-05-23T00:00:00.000+00:00Perception of specific military skills – the impact of perfectionism and self-efficacyhttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/jms-2018-0002<abstract> <title style='display:none'>Abstract</title> <p>We investigated the development of specific military skills in Norwegian cadets during the three-year military academy training as well as the impact of perfectionism and self-efficacy on the development of these skills. Latent growth-curve models were performed with perfectionism as a time-invariant predictor and with self-efficacy as a time-varying predictor. There were significant increases in the Individual Coping Capacity (ICC) and Cooperation in Difficult Situations (CDS) subscales but not in the Motivation to Achievement (MA) subscale. The initial skill levels were not related to the growth of the skills. Both adaptive and maladaptive perfectionism predicted initial values of ICC and CDS, explaining 5% of the variance in the initial ICC levels and 12% of the variance in the initial CDS levels. Perfectionism variables did not explain the development of the three types of military skills over time. Moreover, self-efficacy significantly predicted ICC at all time points and CDS and MA at all time points except at T3. We therefore concluded that cadets with high adaptive perfectionism scores are likely to have higher initial skill levels and that self-efficacious cadets are expected to show a greater development of military skills during military academy training.</p> </abstract>ARTICLE2018-08-04T00:00:00.000+00:00War as nothing but a duel: war as an institution and the construction of the Western military professionhttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/jms-2018-0003<abstract> <title style='display:none'>Abstract</title> <p>Like all repetitive human interaction, even war has been institutionalized and fought according to conventions and norms. Historically, this institutionalization is apparent from the way war has been compared to the duel, first in the 14th century and most famously by Carl von Clausewitz 5 centuries later. This article continues this train of thought and argues that the observed limits of Western “professional orthodoxy” and “strategic vocabulary” can be traced to how war has been institutionalized by the military profession. This offers an alternative explanation to the prevailing views of why the West has struggled in contemporary wars: it is the fundamental mismatch between these professional norms in the West and those held by their opponents that forms the biggest asymmetry in contemporary war. As this asymmetry is unlikely to disappear, these professional norms need to be reconsidered: just like the aristocracy with the duel by the late 19th century, the Western military profession appears stuck in an institution that is increasingly becoming obsolete. Without such reconsideration, the attainment of decision – the central strategic objective in war – and hence victory in future wars will remain uncertain.</p></abstract>ARTICLE2018-11-26T00:00:00.000+00:00Rethinking the unthinkable – revisiting theories of nuclear deterrence and escalationhttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/JMS-2018-0001ARTICLE2018-12-28T00:00:00.000+00:00Predictors of Gaming Behavior among Military Peacekeepers – Exploring the Role of Boredom and Loneliness in Relation to Gaming Problemshttps://sciendo.com/article/10.1515/jms-2017-0001<abstract> <title style='display:none'>Abstract</title> <p>The aim of the current study was to explore gaming problems in post-deployment veterans and to investigate whether boredom and loneliness can predict levels of gaming problems. The general well-being of veterans post their deployments to war zones is linked to an array of negative health consequences, and veterans may be at risk for developing gaming problems after homecomings. Problems that may be related to engagement in gaming include coping with negative emotions, such as boredom and loneliness, which are often faced by homecoming veterans as well. The sample in this study comprised Afghanistan veterans (N = 246), with a mean age of 37.5 years (standard deviation = 9.6 years), and 8.8% of the veterans showed symptoms indicative of problem gaming. This is not higher than that found in the general adult population in Norway. Logistic regression analyses showed that boredom proneness (lack of internal stimulation) and enhancement motivation were independent significant predictors of gaming problems, after controlling for age, gender, coping motivation, social motivation, anxiety, depression, loneliness, lack of external stimulation, hazardous drinking, and combat exposure. These factors accounted for as much as 65.8% of the variance in gaming problem status. We conclude that veterans who are highly motivated by enhancement motives and score low on lack of internal stimulation may be prone to developing gaming problems.</p></abstract>ARTICLE2017-06-16T00:00:00.000+00:00Russian hybrid warfare: A frameworkhttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/jms-2021-0004<abstract><title style='display:none'>Abstract</title><p>As Montenegro sough to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 2015, an attempted coup erupted within the country in October of that year. <italic>The Telegraph's</italic> Ben Farmer reported that, ‘An officer with Russia's GRU military intelligence service, is accused of running a web of Serbian and Russian nationalists and paramilitaries who plotted to assassinate the Montenegrin prime minister.’<fn id="j_jms-2021-0004_fn_001_w2aab3b7b2b1b6b1aab1c11b1b3Aa" symbol="1"><p>Farmer, B. (2017, February 26). Montenegro to Indict Russian Spy Behind Coup Plot. <italic>The Telegraph</italic>. Available at: <ext-link ext-link-type="uri" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xlink:href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/02/26/montenegro-indict-russian-spy-behind-coup-plot/">http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/02/26/montenegro-indict-russian-spy-behind-coup-plot/</ext-link>. [accessed 5 March, 2017].</p></fn> The failed coup and attempted assassination were conducted by Russian intelligence in support of Russian President Vladimir Putin's vision for a modern Eurasia in which NATO discontinues encroaching on Russia's sphere of influence and in which Russia ascends to regional hegemony.<fn id="j_jms-2021-0004_fn_002_w2aab3b7b2b1b6b1aab1c11b1b5Aa" symbol="2"><p>Knezevic, G. (2017, January 2). Montenegro's NATO-Russia Chess Match. <italic>Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty</italic>. Available at: <ext-link ext-link-type="uri" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xlink:href="http://www.rferl.org/a/montenegro-nato-russia-chess-match/28210094.html">http://www.rferl.org/a/montenegro-nato-russia-chess-match/28210094.html</ext-link>. [accessed 5 March, 2017].</p></fn></p><p>Although unsuccessful, this covert operation—conducted by Russian intelligence working in conjunction with disaffected Russian partisans within Montenegro—to stymie NATO's expansion captures the essence of modern Russian hybrid warfare. Nevertheless, Montenegro is not unique, but instead is one of many recent hybrid conflicts propagated by the Russian government. Speaking on the spectre of Russian operations in Eastern Europe, American general Michael Williamson commented, ‘In terms of state-based challenges, Russia's purported annexation of Crimea and invasion of Ukraine demonstrated a sophisticated combination of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic means to achieve objectives below a threshold that the Russian leadership believe would elicit a concerted NATO response.’<fn id="j_jms-2021-0004_fn_003_w2aab3b7b2b1b6b1aab1c11b2b1Aa" symbol="3"><p>Lt. Gen. Michael Williamson, Lt. Gen. H. R. McMaster, Lt. Gen. Joseph Anderson, and Lt. Gen. John Murray, statement to the Subcommittee on AirLand, Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, on Army Modernization in Review of the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2017, Second Session, 114th Congress, 5 April 2016.</p></fn></p><p>Since 2008, Russia's operations throughout Europe, its Near Abroad and Syria signal an evolved approach to the conduct of war. Many terms and phrases have been attributed to Russia's evolved model of war to include Grey Zone conflict and new generation warfare. However, hybrid war or hybrid warfare is quite useful, despite the contention the term generates. The term hybrid warfare is useful because it speaks of the bundling of capabilities, technology and ideas in a coherent, purposeful manner to accomplish tactical, operational and strategic objectives on behalf of policymakers and strategists.</p><p>The work starting position is that the Russian hybrid warfare is in fact an applied way of war. Despite many arguments to the contrary, Russia's applied way of war introduces important nuances to the conduct of war. Resultantly, the purpose of this work is to clarify the concept of Russian hybrid warfare and to identify the characteristics that make it worthy of examination.</p><p>Two basic methods exist to explain an observable way of war. The first is to paraphrase existing primary source information on the subject. This method requires access to primary source information and the physical ability to read that material. That method is not employed in this work because access to Russian strategic and tactical doctrine is not readily available to the layperson. Furthermore, in many cases doctrine is a preferred way of war-fighting, a narrative and tied to procurement strategies, and thus, not an applied method. Therefore, merely relying on doctrine or policy statements can mislead the researcher about the true character of a given way of war.</p><p>That notwithstanding, the second method is to observe the phenomenon in multiple situations over a period of time. In doing so, the observer seeks to identify trends, inconsistencies, rules, relationships, reactions and boundaries that surface and recur therein and then generate an over-arching assessment about that phenomenon's boundaries and inner workings. That is the technique employed here.</p></abstract>ARTICLE2021-05-09T00:00:00.000+00:00Teaching efficacy of U.S. Air Force enlisted professional military educators during the COVID-19 pandemichttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/jms-2021-0002<abstract><title style='display:none'>Abstract</title><p>Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, U.S. Air Force Enlisted Professional Military Education (EPME) was forced to deliver traditionally in-person leadership development interventions in an online, instructor-facilitated format for the first time in the history of the programme. Despite the absence of training to teach in online learning environments, hundreds of instructors within 80 schoolhouses were charged with embracing this pedagogic shift to continue developing enlisted leaders during a global pandemic. This study examined the sense of self-efficacy of 129 instructors across all levels of U.S. Air Force EPME by utilising a 32-item self-efficacy measurement instrument. This study has implications for enlisted and officer professional military education leaders interested in training and developing faculty to teach in online learning environments. Overall, instructors felt confident in their abilities to teach online, despite pre-service training having focussed solely on in-person instruction. Results indicated a positive relationship between higher senses of self-efficacy and years of instructors’ experience. Instructors who worked with an instructional support specialist showed a significantly higher sense of self-efficacy than instructors who did not. Future studies should aim to integrate multiple perspectives of the efficacy of U.S. Air Force EPME instructors, such as those from students, administrators and colleagues.</p></abstract>ARTICLE2021-05-02T00:00:00.000+00:00Personality traits and select socio-demographic variables as predictors of military morale: longitudinal research in the Estonian defence forceshttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/jms-2021-0003<abstract><title style='display:none'>Abstract</title><p>Military morale is a concept widely used to describe the motivational element of soldiers’ will to fight or “the energy that drives soldiers to perform qualitatively better in stressful conditions, characterised by enthusiasm and persistence when engaging in collective, i.e. unit-level activities”. This longitudinal study explored the interlink-ages between perceptions of military morale, the Big Five personality traits and select socio-demographic characteristics among the conscripts of the Estonian Defence Forces and predicting directly measurable individual and collective types of military morale. Moreover, the fluctuation of military morale over the training cycle of conscript service (11 months) was tracked. The findings indicate that at the start of military service, individual morale has a low or medium statistically significant correlation with conscripts’ personality traits, with Conscientiousness and Neuroticism demonstrating the strongest relations; however, the correlation with Neuroticism was negative. Additionally, when viewed throughout the course of the entire training cycle, the morale demonstrated a U-shaped progression, i.e. high at the beginning, dropping in the middle and rising back up at the end of military service. At the same time, socio-demographic variables demonstrated little or non-significant role in predicting individual or collective morale. The results indicate that morale fluctuates over time and is affected by personal characteristics. For practitioners, these results could help to reinforce the positive impact of morale on collective and individual performances.</p></abstract>ARTICLE2021-04-30T00:00:00.000+00:00Leveraging network-centric strategic goals in capabilitieshttps://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/jms-2021-0001<abstract><title style='display:none'>Abstract</title><p>The vision of network-centric operations is to increase operational capabilities through networked collaboration. NATO and its member nations state this vision in strategic documents at a very high level of abstraction. While suitable for giving an overall feel, current documentation renders the steps toward implementing those visions largely unsupported. We outline a method that is based on agile requirements engineering, for converting high-level strategic visions into capabilities whose forms lend themselves to incremental implementation. We illustrate the use of this method in two cases that deal with both operational capabilities and technical capabilities. We also show how the method enables one to prioritise which capabilities to develop first. We conclude that it is necessary to formulate and implement some form of explicit methodology with which to span the gap between strategic visions and an effective implementation of those visions.</p></abstract>ARTICLE2021-04-19T00:00:00.000+00:00“Verum Est Ipsum Factum” – True is What Has Been Made as Suchhttps://sciendo.com/article/10.1515/jms-2016-0171<abstract><title style='display:none'>Abstract</title><p> In traditional International Relations theory (IR), states have been approached from empiricist perspective by using methods and terminologies that consider states as homogeneous ‘speaking billiard balls’, which compete for power, prestige and so forth with each other. This article does not argue that traditional paradigms of IR (such as Classical Realism or Neorealism) would not count any more, vice versa, but what this article argues is that for being able to understand more deeply such topical social phenomena as terrorism, strategic communities, spread of nuclear weapons, nuclear policies, world order, NATO-enlargement, EU-integration, threat scenarios, enemy images an so forth, one has to adopt a more holistic, Constructivist social theoretical, approach than traditional IR offers. In this context Constructivism necessitates at least three things. Firstly, one has to explicitly clear out his/her ontological and epistemological points of departure for being able to operate with Constructivist social theory. In some occasions it may e.g. be necessary to deal with God’s and religions’ ontological and epistemological statuses as signifiers of interests, or as ‘root causes’ of behaviour of many social groups, communities and nations. Secondly, the state should be considered as a ‘decentred subject’ consisting of individuals, many sub-groups, organizational structure, institutions and especially identity structure, which has been purposefully constructed throughout the history (the endogenous perspective), and which is under constant reconstruction through domestic and international discursive interactions (the interactionist perspective). Thirdly, one should take into account that human communities and societies tend to habituate themselves into certain beliefs, values and modes of action that change very slowly over the course of history (the cultural perspective), despite increasing interactions.</p></abstract>ARTICLE2016-11-23T00:00:00.000+00:00Strategy as Discursive Construction in the Finnish Defence Forceshttps://sciendo.com/article/10.1515/jms-2016-0174<abstract><title style='display:none'>Abstract</title><p> This paper draws upon critical discourse analysis to analyse an empirical study of strategy practices in a military organization. The recent practice-turn in strategy research emphasizes the meaning of discourses, routines and activities in a strategy formation process. Strategy is not understood only as an attribute of an organization, but also as activity; it is something people do and say or leave undone and unspoken. Research concerning strategy practices has, however, ignored military organizations and concentrated mainly on private enterprises and public administration. In this paper we argue that there is a need for a practice-turn in the military context as well. Just as practice theory has proven its usefulness in examining corporate strategies, it can also contribute to our understanding of the actual strategy process in military organizations and help us understand the practices behind formulated strategy. </p><p>We focus on the high-level strategic planners in the Finnish Defence Forces and analyse their conceptions of the strategy process. Based on the data of 14 in-depth interviews, the paper's goal is to analyse the discursive elements of strategy talk in a military organization. This paper will concentrate on three central issues. (1) What is the relationship between civil and military strategists while formulating strategy in a military organization? (2) Who are defined as strategists? (3) Are the high-level strategy planners aware of a variety of hidden agendas and power relations that shape the strategy formulation process? Although the discourses and practices we have found are, of course, context-specific, we claim that similar kind of strategic discourses and practices can be found in other military organizations and possibly even in non-military organizations.</p><p>Research on civil-military relations has traditionally concentrated on examining the interaction between civil and military organizations but neglected the interaction within these organizations. Our study shows that formulating strategy in military organizations is a complex process far from the Clausewitzian conception that delimits the concept of strategy only to conventional war. Direction-setting, monitoring and allocation of resources are all outcomes of a constant debate between political, military, technological, economical and cultural aspects. Getting to know this kind of process can be beneficial for strategy researchers and managers working in the corporate field as well. </p><p>In addition, the Finnish Defence Forces constitute an interesting field for strategy research, as it is one of the three European armies that relies on compulsory military service. The fact that almost every male citizen has served guarantees a special position for this institution in society and particularly in strategy discourses. </p></abstract>ARTICLE2016-11-23T00:00:00.000+00:00Usability Monitoring – Extending Quality of Service Monitoring for Decision Makinghttps://sciendo.com/article/10.1515/jms-2016-0173<abstract><title style='display:none'>Abstract</title><p> The paper presents a new concept, Usability Monitoring, and applies it for situational awareness applications in military Command, Control, Communication, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance systems (C4ISR). Usability Monitoring means taking measurements of technical Quality of Service (QoS) parameters in end systems and comparing them to target values of reference cases. The concept differs from QoS monitoring in the goal and in the placement of measurement points: In QoS monitoring the goal is to verify that the network provides the promised service quality in the user system - network interface. QoS monitoring does not capture the actual end user experience, which is influenced also by the end system, and therefore it does not directly correspond to the service quality that a user sees. Usability Monitoring has exactly this goal. The Observe-Orient-Decide-Act-Loop (OODA) is a decision making concept that is widely used in the network-centric approach and it emphasizes fast decision making. The presented model for Usability Monitoring is based on the OODA-loop. It includes QoS measurements not only in the Act-phase, i.e., can the user perform the actions s/he wants or are there delays and losses that make the system less usable, but also in the Observe-phase, i.e., does the user get the information s/he subscribes to, and in the Orient-phase, i.e., does the user get confusing information and cannot orient, and also the Decide-phase, i.e. is the user able to make right decisions based on the previous steps. The measured technical QoS parameters are connected to user experience by Mean of Score (MOS) functions that are obtained by usability tests. </p><p>A case study for partially evaluating the Usability Monitoring concept is from MNE5 MSA (Multinational Experimentation 5, Maritime Situational Awareness) Experimentation Event 3 that was conducted in partnership with the Navy Command Finland, Naval Warfare Centre of Sweden and NATO Allied Command Transformation (ACT) and the Singaporean Armed Forces (SAF) Future Systems Directorate. In the MNE5 MSA experimentation we were able to monitor end user experience, how the user sees the services and is able to work with the current tools and capabilities. In this article we describe how Usability Monitoring was addressed in the MNE5 MSA case study: meters for Usability Monitoring were selected and we investigated what aspects of usability affect the phases of the OODA-loop. </p></abstract>ARTICLE2016-11-23T00:00:00.000+00:00en-us-1