1. bookVolume 29 (2021): Issue 3 (September 2021)
Journal Details
First Published
30 Mar 2015
Publication timeframe
4 times per year
access type Open Access

Managerial Entrenchment and Firm Performance: Evidence from Moroccan Listed Companies

Published Online: 28 Oct 2021
Volume & Issue: Volume 29 (2021) - Issue 3 (September 2021)
Page range: 40 - 62
Received: 28 Aug 2020
Accepted: 22 Apr 2021
Journal Details
First Published
30 Mar 2015
Publication timeframe
4 times per year

Purpose: Grounded in agency and entrenchment theories, this study assumes that CEOs’ propensity to entrench themselves can affect firm performance. The purpose of this article is to investigate the relationship between dimensions and mechanisms through which managers entrench themselves and influence firm performance.

Methodology: The article uses OLS regression to explain the assumed relationships between managerial entrenchment and firm performance. The study is based on a sample of 55 Moroccan listed companies over the period 2010–2015.

Findings: Taken together, the findings contribute to a better understanding of the effect of several entrenchment pathways on firm performance. These findings imply that managerial entrenchment is not necessarily detrimental, as suggested by some governance theories. On the contrary, it can have a beneficial effect on wealth creation.

Research limitations/implications: This study faces several limitations. The first appears in the sample size of its quantitative element. The second is related to the variables used to measure managerial entrenchment. The current research explores the effects of the most commonly used measures and some non-retained measures could be pertinent in verifying the assumed relationships.

Originality/value: This analysis is one of the few studies conducted in the African countries that scrutinize the impact of managers’ entrenchment determinants (ownership, duality, age, and tenure) on firm performance.


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