[
Agrawal, A. and Knoeber, C.R. (1996). Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems between Managers and Shareholders. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 31(3), 377–397. https://doi.org/10.2307/2331397.10.2307/2331397
]Search in Google Scholar
[
Anderson, R. and Reeb, D. (2003). Founding-Family Ownership and Firm Performance: Evidence from the S&P 500. Journal of Finance, 58, 1301–1328. https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6261.00567.10.1111/1540-6261.00567
]Search in Google Scholar
[
Berle, A. and Means, G. (1991). The Modern Corporation and Private Property. New York: Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315133188.10.4324/9781315133188
]Search in Google Scholar
[
Berrone, P., Cruz, C. and Gomez-Mejia, L.R. (2012). Socioemotional wealth in family firms theoretical dimensions, assessment approaches, and agenda for future research. Family Business Review, 25(3), 258–279. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0894486511435355.10.1177/0894486511435355
]Search in Google Scholar
[
Byrd, J., Parrino, R. and Pritsch, G. (1998). Stockholder–Manager Conflicts and Firm Value. Financial Analysts Journal, 54(3), 14–30. https://doi.org/10.2469/faj.v54.n3.2177.10.2469/faj.v54.n3.2177
]Search in Google Scholar
[
Cannella, A.A. and Holcomb, T.R. (2005). A Multi-Level Analysis of the Upper-Echelons Model. Research in Multi-Level Issues, 4, 195–237. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1475-9144(05)04009-9.10.1016/S1475-9144(05)04009-9
]Search in Google Scholar
[
Castanias, R.P. and Helfat, C.E. (1992). Managerial and windfall rents in the market for corporate control. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 18(2), 153–184. https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-2681(92)90025-7.10.1016/0167-2681(92)90025-7
]Search in Google Scholar
[
Casson, M. (1999). The economics of family firms. Scandinavian Economic History Review, 47(1), 10–23. https://doi.org/10.1080/03585522.1999.10419802.10.1080/03585522.1999.10419802
]Search in Google Scholar
[
Charreaux, G. (2008). À la recherche du lien perdu entre caractéristiques des dirigeants et performance de la firme: gouvernance et latitude managériale. Economie et Sociétés, 1831–1868.
]Search in Google Scholar
[
Charreaux, G. (2002). L’actionnaire comme apporteur de ressources cognitives. Revue française de gestion, 5(141), 77–107.
]Search in Google Scholar
[
Chen, G.L. and Hambrick, D.C. (2012). CEO replacement in turnaround situations: executive (mis) fit and its performance implications. Organization Science, 23(1), 225–243. https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.1100.0629.10.1287/orsc.1100.0629
]Search in Google Scholar
[
Combs, J.G., Ketchen, D.J., Perryman, A.A. and Donahue, M.S. (2007). The Moderating Effects of CEO Power on the Board Composition-Firm Performance Relationship. Journal of Management Studies, 44(8), 1300–1323. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6486.2007.00708.x.10.1111/j.1467-6486.2007.00708.x
]Search in Google Scholar
[
Cruz, C.C., Gómez-Mejia, L.R. and Becerra, M. (2010). Perceptions of benevolence and the design of agency contracts: CEO-TMT relationships in family firms. Academy of Management Journal, 53(1), 69–89. https://doi.org/10.5465/amj.2010.48036975.10.5465/amj.2010.48036975
]Search in Google Scholar
[
Dalton, D.R. and Dalton, C.M. (2011). Integration of micro and macro studies in governance research: CEO duality, board composition, and financial performance. Journal of Management, 37, 404–11. https://doi.org/10.1177/0149206310373399.10.1177/0149206310373399
]Search in Google Scholar
[
Davis, J.H., Schoorman, F.D. and Donaldson, L. (1997). Toward a stewardship theory of management. The Academy of Management Review, 22(1), 20–47. https://doi.org/10.2307/259223.10.2307/259223
]Search in Google Scholar
[
Dechow, P.M. and Sloan, R.G. (1991). Executive incentives and the horizon problem: An empirical investigation. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 14(1), 51–89. https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-7187(91)90058-S.10.1016/0167-7187(91)90058-S
]Search in Google Scholar
[
Donaldson, L., and Davis, J.H. (1991). Stewardship Theory or Agency Theory: CEO Governance and Shareholder Returns. Australian Journal of Management, 16(1), 49–64. https://doi.org/10.1177/031289629101600103.10.1177/031289629101600103
]Search in Google Scholar
[
Drakos, A.A., and Bekiris, F.V. (2010). Corporate performance, managerial ownership and endogeneity: A simultaneous equations analysis for the Athens stock exchange. Research in International Business and Finance, 24(1), 24–38. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ribaf.2009.01.002.10.1016/j.ribaf.2009.01.002
]Search in Google Scholar
[
Faccio, M., and Lasfer, M.A. (2000). Do occupational pension funds monitor companies in which they hold large stakes? Journal of Corporate Finance, 6(1), 71–110. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0929-1199(99)00016-4.10.1016/S0929-1199(99)00016-4
]Search in Google Scholar
[
Fama, E.F. (1980). Agency problems and the theory of the firm. Journal of Political Economy, 88, 288–307. https://doi.org/10.1086/260866.10.1086/260866
]Search in Google Scholar
[
Fama, E. and Jensen, M. (1983). Separation of Ownership and Control. The Journal of Law & Economics, 26(2), 301–325. https://doi.org/10.1086/467037.10.1086/467037
]Search in Google Scholar
[
Farrar, D. and Glauber, R. (1967). Multicollinearity in Regression Analysis: The Problem Revisited. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 49(1), 92–107. https://doi:10.2307/1937887.10.2307/1937887
]Search in Google Scholar
[
Finkelstein, S. and D’Aveni, R.A. (1994). CEO duality as a double-edged sword: How boards of directors balance entrenchment avoidance and unity of command. Academy of Management Journal, 37(5), 1079–1108. https://doi.org/10.2307/256667.10.2307/256667
]Search in Google Scholar
[
Finkelstein, S. and Hambrick, D.C. (1990). Top-management-team tenure and organizational outcomes: The moderating role of managerial discretion. Administrative Science Quarterly, 35(3), 484–503. https://doi.org/10.2307/2393314.10.2307/2393314
]Search in Google Scholar
[
Fredrickson, J.W., Hambrick, D.C. and Baumrin, S. (1988). A Model of CEO Dismissal. AMR, 13, 255–270. https://doi.org/10.5465/amr.1988.4306882.10.5465/amr.1988.4306882
]Search in Google Scholar
[
Goyal, V.K. and Park, C.W. (2002). Board leadership structure and CEO turnover. Journal of Corporate Finance, 8(1), 49–66. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0929-1199(01)00028-1.10.1016/S0929-1199(01)00028-1
]Search in Google Scholar
[
Hambrick, D.C. (2007). Upper echelons theory: An update. The Academy of Management Review, 32(2), 334–343. https://doi.org/10.5465/amr.2007.24345254.10.5465/amr.2007.24345254
]Search in Google Scholar
[
Hambrick, D.C. and Fukutomi, G.D. (1991). The seasons of a CEO’s tenure. The Academy of Management Review, 16(4), 719–742. https://doi.org/10.2307/258978.10.2307/258978
]Search in Google Scholar
[
Hambrick, D.C., Geletkanycz, M.A. and Fredrickson, J.W. (1993). Top executive commitment to the status quo: Some tests of its determinants, Strategic Management Journal, 14, 401–418. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.4250140602.10.1002/smj.4250140602
]Search in Google Scholar
[
Hambrick, D.C. and Mason, P.A. (1984). Upper Echelons: The Organization as a Reflection of Its Top Managers. The Academy of Management Review, 9(2), 193–206. https://doi.org/10.5465/amr.1984.4277628.10.5465/amr.1984.4277628
]Search in Google Scholar
[
Hermalin, B.E. and Weisbach, M.S. (1988). The determinants of board composition. RAND Journal of Economics, 19, 589–606. https://doi.org/10.2307/2555459.10.2307/2555459
]Search in Google Scholar
[
Hiebl, M.R.W. (2013). Upper echelons theory in management accounting and control research. Journal of Management Control, 24(3), 223–240. https://doi:10.1007/s00187-013-0183-1.10.1007/s00187-013-0183-1
]Search in Google Scholar
[
Holmström, B. (1999), Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective. The Review of Economic Studies, 66(1), 169–182. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937X.00083.10.1111/1467-937X.00083
]Search in Google Scholar
[
Huang, G.L., Dong, F. and Li, H.Q. (2010). The relation of manager characteristics and corporate performance based on perspective of managerial entrenchment. Commercial Research, 9, 54–58.
]Search in Google Scholar
[
Jensen, M.C. and Meckling, W.H. (1994). The Nature of Man. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 7(2), 4–19. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-6622.1994.tb00401.x.10.1111/j.1745-6622.1994.tb00401.x
]Search in Google Scholar
[
Jensen, M.C. and Meckling, W.H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305–360. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(76)90026-X.10.1016/0304-405X(76)90026-X
]Search in Google Scholar
[
Krause, R., Semadeni, M. and Cannella, A.A. (2014). CEO Duality: A Review and Research Agenda. Journal of Management, 40(1), 256–286. https://doi.org/10.1177/0149206313503013.10.1177/0149206313503013
]Search in Google Scholar
[
Lee, H-k. and Park, J-H. (2008). The influence of top management team international exposure on international alliance formation. Journal of Management Studies, 45(5), 961–981. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6486.2008.00772.x.10.1111/j.1467-6486.2008.00772.x
]Search in Google Scholar
[
Mignon, S. (2000). La Pérennité des Entreprises Familiales: Un Modèle Alternatif à la Création de Valeur pour l´Actionnaire? Finance Contrôle Stratégie, 3(1), 169–196.
]Search in Google Scholar
[
Morck, R., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R.W. (1988). Management ownership and market valuation: An empirical analysis. Journal of Financial Economics, 20(1–2), 293–315. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(88)90048-7.10.1016/0304-405X(88)90048-7
]Search in Google Scholar
[
Neter, J., Wasserman, W. and Kutner, M.H. (1989). Applied Linear Regression Models. 2nd edition, Richard D. Irwin, Inc., Homewood.
]Search in Google Scholar
[
Pichard-Stamford, J.P. (2002). L’enracinement des dirigeants familiaux. In: J. Caby and G. Hirigoyen (eds.), La gestion des entreprises familiales. Paris-Economica.
]Search in Google Scholar
[
Pichard-Stanford, J.P. (2000). Légitimité et enracinement du dirigeant par le réseau des administrateurs. Finance Contrôle Stratégie, 4(3), 143–178.
]Search in Google Scholar
[
Pigé, B. (1998) Enracinement des dirigeants et richesse des actionnaires, Finance Contrôle Stratégie, 1(3), 131–158.
]Search in Google Scholar
[
Prevost, A., Rao, R. and Hossain, M. (2002). Determinants of board composition in New Zealand: A simultaneous equations approach. Journal of Empirical Finance, 9(4), 373–397. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0927-5398(02)00002-6.10.1016/S0927-5398(02)00002-6
]Search in Google Scholar
[
Rossow, G.J. (2005). Business ethics and corporate governance in Africa. Business & Society, 44(1), 94–106. https://doi.org/10.1177/0007650305274851.10.1177/0007650305274851
]Search in Google Scholar
[
Shivdasani, A. and Yermack, D. (1999). CEO Involvement in the Selection of New Board Members: An Empirical Analysis. The Journal of Finance, 54(5), 1829–1853. https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-1082.00168.10.1111/0022-1082.00168
]Search in Google Scholar
[
Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R.W. (1989). Management Entrenchment: the Case of Manager Specific Investments. Journal of Financial Economics, 25(1), 123–139. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(89)90099-8.10.1016/0304-405X(89)90099-8
]Search in Google Scholar
[
Smith, C. and Watts, R. (1992). The Investment Opportunity Set and Corporate Financing, Dividend, and Compensation Policies. Journal of Financial Economics, 32(3), 263–292. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(92)90029-W.10.1016/0304-405X(92)90029-W
]Search in Google Scholar
[
Stern, I. and Westphal, J.D. (2010). Stealthy Footsteps to the Boardroom: Executives’ Backgrounds, Sophisticated Interpersonal Influence Behavior, and Board Appointments. Administrative Science Quarterly, 55(2), 278–319. https://doi.org/10.2189/asqu.2010.55.2.278.10.2189/asqu.2010.55.2.278
]Search in Google Scholar
[
Stiglitz, J.E. and Edlin, A.S. (1995). Discouraging Rivals: Managerial Rent-Seeking and Economic Inefficiencies. American Economic Review, American Economic Association, 85(5), 1301–1312.
]Search in Google Scholar
[
Surroca, J. and Tribó, J.A. (2008). Managerial entrenchment and corporate social performance, Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 35(5–6), 748–789. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5957.2008.02090.x.10.1111/j.1468-5957.2008.02090.x
]Search in Google Scholar
[
Thomas, A., Litschert, R.J. and Ramaswamy, K. (1991). The Performance Impact of Strategy-Manager Coalignment: An Empirical Examination, Strategic Management Journal, 12(7), 509–522. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.4250120704.10.1002/smj.4250120704
]Search in Google Scholar
[
Very, P. (2004). The Management of Mergers and Acquisitions. John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
]Search in Google Scholar
[
Wade, J., O’Reilly, C., and Chandratat, I. (1990). Golden Parachutes: CEOs and the Exercise of Social Influence. Administrative Science Quarterly, 35(4), 587–603. https://doi.org/10.2307/2393510.10.2307/2393510
]Search in Google Scholar
[
Westphal, J. and Zajac, E. (1995). Who Shall Govern? CEO/Board Power, Demographic Similarity, and New Director Selection. Administrative Science Quarterly, 40(1), 60–83. https://doi.org/10.2307/2393700.10.2307/2393700
]Search in Google Scholar
[
Zenou, E. (2006). La contribution du dirigeant à la création de valeur: au-delà de la discipline. Une analyse empirique sur le marché français. Lecture presented at CEREN 17, Groupe ESC Dijon Bourgogne.
]Search in Google Scholar
[
Zingales, L.G. (2000). In Search of New Foundations. Journal of Finance, 55(4), 1623–1653. https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-1082.00262.10.1111/0022-1082.00262
]Search in Google Scholar
